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Of Coase, Calabresi, and Optimal 
Tax Liability 
KYLE D. LOGUE* AND JOEL SLEMROD** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In his 1960 paper The Problem of Social Cost, Ronald Coase fa­
mously observed that, in a world with zero transactions costs, negotia­
tion among interested parties can overcome the inefficiencies 
otherwise caused by externalities.1 This is sometimes referred to as 
Coase's "efficiency proposition."2 Coase further argued that, in this 
frictionless world, the assignment of legal entitlements or obligations 
would not affect the ultimate allocation of resources, and therefore 
the efficiency of this allocation.3 This is sometimes known as Coase's 
"invariance proposition. "4 
These two propositions collectively make up the so-called Coase 
Theorem.5 Thus, for example, in the absence of transaction costs, it is 
irrelevant whether we give a manufacturer the "right to pollute" or we 
give the adjoining property owner the "right to be free of pollution. "6 
Either way, the parties will agree to the same (efficient) amount of 
pollution. Coase also noted that the assignment of legal entitlements 
can have distributional consequences, despite the absence of transac­
tion costs. Thus, although it makes no difference in terms of efficiency 
whether the polluter or the pollutee has the relevant legal entitlement, 
again assuming zero transaction costs, the assignment of the legal enti­
tlement can make a big difference to the parties involved and can dra-
* Wade H. McCree Jr. Collegiate Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. 
** Paul W. McCracken Collegiate Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy, 
Director of the Office of Tax Policy Research, Stephen M. Ross School of Business, 
University of Michigan. We thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, Leandra Lederman, Mitchell 
Polinsky, Roberta Romano, George Siedel, and workshop participants at Columbia Law 
School, University of Michigan Law School, University of Toronto Faculty of Law, and 
Yale Law School for comments. 
1 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & Econ. 1 (1960). 
2 Steven G. Medema & Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr., The Coase Theorem, in 1 Encyclopedia 
of Law and Economics 836, 837-39 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000). 
3 Id. 
4 Id. at 840. 
s Id. 
6 Id. at 839. 
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matically affect their relative wealth. We refer to this observation as 
the Coasean "distributional variance proposition." 
Although Coase's original paper focused on a hypothetical world in 
which transaction costs were totally absent, Coase was well aware that 
in all real-world settings transaction costs are present and, in many 
settings, are high.7 For this reason, the Coase Theorem is perhaps 
most influential for what it says about a world with transaction costs: 
That in such a world the assignment of legal entitlements (or the 
choice of legal rules) can affect overall efficiency.8 Indeed, this re­
statement of Coase's basic point can reasonably be understood as the 
conceptual foundation of the entire law and economics movement, 
which has risen to prominence within the U.S. legal academy over the 
past several decades. Most law and economics scholarship in the 
fields of torts, property, and contract law can be seen as attempting to 
assess whether existing legal rules are efficient or to ascertain the most 
efficient legal rule for a given situation, given the existence of transac­
tion costs. 
One famous example of this sort of scholarship would be the work 
of Guido Calabresi in tort law. In his seminal book, The Cost of Acci­
dents: A Legal and Economic Analysis, Calabresi concluded that, as­
suming transaction costs prevent a Coasean result, the optimal tort 
liability regime is one that minimizes the sum of the cost of accidents 
and the cost of avoiding accidents, including the administrative costs 
of the tort system.9 Calabresi concluded that such a regime will some­
times call for assigning tort liability to the "cheapest cost avoider"­
that is, to the party able to minimize negative externalities (or third­
party harms) most efficiently.10 We refer to this party as the cheapest­
cost or least-cost harm avoider.11 
Unbeknownst to most lawyers, but well known to economists, there 
is a theorem within the economic analysis of taxation that is, on its 
face, strikingly similar to the Coase Theorem. This notion, dubbed the 
"theorem of the invariance of tax incidence" has been present in the 
public finance literature for decades.12 Although this theorem is 
rarely stated formally, the informal version goes something like this: 
7 Ronald H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the Law 174 (1988) ("The world of zero 
transaction costs has often been described as a Coasian world. Nothing could be further 
from the truth."). 
B See A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 15 (3d ed. 2003). 
9 Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 31 (1970). 
10 Id. at 135. 
11 See id. 
12 This term was coined by Pierre Picard & Eric Toulemonde, On the Equivalence of 
Taxes Paid by Employers and Employees, 48 Scottish J. Pol. Econ. 461, 464 (2001) (citing 
Hugh Dalton, Principles of Public Finance 38 (1954), who wrote: "It makes no essential 
difference whether the tax is legally imposed on buyers or sellers."). 
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The incidence of a tax imposed on the sale or purchase of a good or 
service will be independent of the assignment of the legal obligation to 
remit the tax to the government.13 That is to say, it does not matter if 
the obligation to remit the tax is imposed on the seller or the pur­
chaser of a good or service: The result will be the same. By "obliga­
tion to remit" we mean the obligation imposed by law on a private 
party to transfer funds in satisfaction of a particular legal liability. (As 
we discuss more fully below, a precise statement of the Coase Theo­
rem also requires the use of the concept of remittance. )14 As with the 
Coase Theorem, the tax remittance invariance conclusion depends on 
a number of assumptions, although in the tax remittance case the as­
sumptions have largely been implicit. Because this version of the tax 
remittance invariance idea is about incidence, we refer to it as the 
"Tax Remittance Invariance Proposition-Incidence" (TRIPI) . 
The reasoning underlying the tax remittance idea also implies a par­
allel efficiency (or inefficiency) proposition. That is, under standard 
competitive-market assumptions, the allocation of resources-and 
therefore the welfare costs of a tax-do not depend on who (as be­
tween the two parties to the transaction) is required to remit the tax to 
the government. We call this the "Tax Remittance Invariance Pro­
position-Efficiency (TRIPE)." 
In contrast to the vast literature expanding on the Coase Theo­
rem-exploring its implications for various areas of private law (in­
cluding torts) and investigating its underlying assumptions15-little 
scholarly attention has been directed at understanding the key as­
sumptions underlying the tax law invariance ideas.16 What is even 
more puzzling is that, despite the general acceptance of the tax remit­
tance invariance propositions within the public finance literature and 
the canonical status of the Coase Theorem within the law and eco­
nomics literature, the obvious parallels, and somewhat less obvious 
differences, between Coase and the TRIPs have gone completely 
unanalyzed. In this Article, using examples from tort law as our pri­
mary analytical lens, we aim to fill these gaps in the literature. In 
addition, we explore the generality or lack of generality of the tax 
remittance propositions by incorporating some of the insights of the 
Coase literature; and we examine the extent to which the tax remit-
13 See, e.g., Harvey S. Rosen & Ted Gayer, Public Finance 80 (8th ed. 2008); Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Economics of the Public Sector 134-35, 219 (3d ed. 2000). 
14 See text accompanying notes 22-25. 
15 Some of this literature is cited and summarized in Medema & Zerbe, note 2, and in 
David de Meza, Coase Theorem, in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and Law 
270 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). 
16 One exception is Joel Slemrod, Does It Matter Who Writes the Check to the Govern­
ment? The Economics of Tax Remittance, 61 Nat'l Tax J. 251 (2008). 
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tance invariance propositions depend on their underlying assump­
tions, just as is the case with the Coase Theorem. 
One contribution of the Article to the Coase literature is to empha­
size the importance of the distinction between two general types of 
situations: those in which the parties in question-the ones whose ac­
tivities are jointly causing an external harm or cost-are in a contrac­
tual or market (that is, buyer/seller) relationship with each other and 
those in which they are not. Furthermore, we show how the same 
distinction matters in the tax context.17 Thus, we explain how Coase's 
distributional variance proposition applies only in nonmarket settings, 
such as those involving conflicting land uses, as in the classic case of 
the farmer and the rancher. In market settings, however, a sort of 
distributional invariance proposition will hold. That is, regardless of 
which party is assigned the obligation to remit a given cost, the actual 
burden of that cost remittance obligation will depend on the relative 
elasticities of supply and demand for whatever good or service is the 
subject of the contractual relationship and the origin of the incurred 
cost.18 In the economics literature, of course, a version of the same 
point exists with respect to taxes (rather than harms) that are trig­
gered by transactions; we gave it the name TRIPI above. 
The primary normative conclusion that emerges from this Article's 
blending of torts and tax can be summarized as follows: Parallel with 
Calabresi's canonical formulation for the design of an optimal tort sys­
tem, an optimal tax remittance regime requires that tax liabilities be 
assigned so as to minimize the overall social costs of compliance and 
administration, for a given level of achievement of the tax law's de­
sired distributional and revenue goals. By compliance costs we mean 
the private costs to the parties (and therefore the social costs) of com­
plying with the law. By administrative costs, we mean the nonprivate 
social costs of enforcing compliance with the law.19 As is true with the 
administration of the civil liability system, the overall compliance and 
administrative costs of a tax system will sometimes differ dramatically 
depending on which party or class of parties (for example, employers 
17 With any market purchase of goods or services, even in a spot market, there will be 
some sort of explicit or implicit contract. For that reason, we use the terms "market set­
ting" and "contractual setting" synonymously. 
18 Richard Craswell ably demonstrates this point. See Richard Craswell, Passing on the 
Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 Stan. L. 
Rev. 361 , 366-67 (1991). Craswell's article focuses on the contractual relationship between 
injurers and victims (such as product manufacturers and product consumers). Our analysis 
focuses on situations in which two or more parties are collaborating in some activity that 
causes harm to a third party. Id. at 361-98. 
19 We do not regard fines that are imposed as part of an enforcement regime as social 
costs, since fines are transfers of resources from one party to another. However, we do 
regard the costs of administering and enforcing a system of fines as real social costs. 
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versus employees, consumers versus retail businesses) is saddled with 
the legal obligation to transfer the tax monies to the government. 
Thus, optimal tax policy in some situations may call for assigning the 
tax remittance obligation to the lowest-compliance-cost tax remitter­
that is, the party with the lowest private compliance costs per dollar of 
tax remitted. By contrast, it sometimes will be optimal to assign the 
remittance obligation to the party for whom the administrative (or 
enforcement) cost per dollar of tax revenue raised is lowest-or the 
lowest-administrative-cost tax remitter. For one example, if the remit­
tance obligation is assigned to a party who is innately dishonest 
(someone who has not internalized the norm of tax law compliance) 
and who is engaged in a business that provides numerous low-cost 
opportunities for evasion, then either much of the tax will go uncol­
lected (assuming a fixed IRS enforcement budget) or the cost of col­
lection for the government will be much higher than if the remittance 
obligation were imposed on an inherently compliant (well-socialized) 
party.20 
For the same reasons, the government will want to avoid placing the 
remittance obligation on the lowest-cost liability avoider; that is, the 
party who can most cheaply (in terms of private costs) avoid enforce­
ment of the tort or tax law. This would be the party for whom it is 
most administratively expensive for the government to make comply. 
What this implies is that, contrary to the nai."ve interpretation of the 
Coase Theorem and of TRIPs (but consistent with the Calabresian 
notion of the least-cost harm avoider), overall social welfare will be 
maximized only if the tax planning authority takes into account the 
relative compliance and administrative costs in assigning tax remit­
tance obligations. 
One can distinguish between the obligation to remit a tax-to trans­
fer resources to the government-and the obligation to report or in­
form the government about a tax liability. An example of the former 
is the obligation placed on employers to remit withholding taxes on 
employees' wages. An example of the latter is the employers' obliga­
tion to submit W-2 forms to the Service detailing the amount of wages 
paid to employees. As we discuss further below, both of these obliga­
tions are important to tax enforcement, although we emphasize remit­
tance.21 Tax-remittance and information-reporting obligations usually 
go together (that is, a party with a remittance obligation usually also 
20 Of course, an individual's willingness to comply voluntarily with the law, in the ab­
sence of a threat of external punishment, is not necessarily an inherent trait. Society actu­
ally spends resources to inculcate such values. For purposes of this Article, however, we 
ignore the social costs of instilling in individuals the willingness to comply in the absence of 
a threat of external punishment. 
21 See text accompanying notes 106-37. 
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has an information reporting obligation-at least insofar as the act of 
remitting itself is a type of information reporting); however, the link 
between remittance and reporting is not logically necessary and in 
theory could be split up. We discuss this possibility below.22 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II offers a primer on the 
Coase Theorem, beginning with the classic case of neighbor external­
izing on neighbor (farmer and rancher), and it explains the basic in­
variance propositions. Part III shifts the focus to Coasean situations 
involving buyers and sellers in a market or contractual relationship, 
buyers and sellers whose market interactions cause harm to third par­
ties. Using supply-and-demand diagrams, we illustrate (in a new way) 
some of the most basic findings of the economic analysis of law, in­
cluding both the Coasean invariance and efficiency propositions and 
the Calabresian least-cost avoider idea. Also in Part III we make an 
efficiency argument for vicarious employer liability for employee torts 
and suggest this doctrine in theory could be expanded in certain situa­
tions to (1) independent contractors and (2) torts beyond the scope of 
employment. Our analysis builds on the standard law and economics 
analysis of vicarious liability, but emphasizes the need to minimize not 
only the costs of third-party harms but also administrative costs. 
Part IV then moves from torts to tax-specifically, to taxes trig­
gered by buyer/seller market relationships, such as employer/em­
ployee interactions. That Part uses supply-and-demand curves to 
illustrate the tax remittance invariance propositions in their classic 
form, as found in every public finance textbook, under the assump­
tions of zero (or symmetrical) compliance and administrative costs. 
Part IV then uses those same diagrams to explain how the invariance 
propositions no longer apply under the more realistic assumptions of 
asymmetric compliance and administrative costs. More specifically, 
we show that the optimal assignment of tax remittance responsibility 
(as between buyer and seller) turns on which assignment minimizes 
the sum of compliance and administrative costs incurred to raise a 
given amount of revenue. We argue that, in general, the least-overall­
cost tax remitter, for taxes triggered by buyer/seller transactions, will 
be the larger, wealthier party-both because there are economies of 
scale to enforcement against large tax remitter's and because wealth­
ier taxpayers are less likely to be judgment-proof. 
Part V discusses some of the real-world implications of our analysis, 
both normative and positive. As a positive matter, our analysis pro­
vides an explanation for why the U.S. income tax system and most 
other income tax systems require employers to remit the bulk of their 
employee's personal income tax liabilities. Likewise, our analysis ex-
22 See text accompanying notes 146-52. 
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plains why the remittance obligation for sales taxes is usually imposed 
on sellers rather than buyers. In addition, our framework explains 
why tax remittance obligations are generally made mandatory (or 
nontransferable) in the sense that Coasean bargaining over the tax 
remittance obligation is not permitted. Finally, our analysis also helps 
to explain why the remittance obligation for the gift tax is imposed, 
initially, on the donor and, secondarily, on the donee. 
In addition to providing a way of understanding current tax law, our 
framework also suggests some possible reforms of existing tax en­
forcement policy. For example, we argue, under certain conditions, 
for expanding employers' tax remittance obligation to include pay­
ments to independent contractors, as employers in those situations are 
more likely to be the least-cost remitters-both in terms of compli­
ance and administrative costs. In other words, the existing distinction 
between employees and independent contractors, which may be opti­
mal for tort law purposes, may not be optimally drawn for tax remit­
tance purposes. In addition, we explore the possibility of expanding 
the role of employers as remitters for their employees' (and contrac­
tors') tax liabilities even for income earned outside of the employment 
(or contractual) relationship. We also point out that current withhold­
ing rules with respect to tip income of employees in service businesses 
(especially in restaurants) could be strengthened to exploit the cheap­
est-cost remitter idea. With the tipping example, we also explore fur­
ther the distinction between remittance and reporting and why the 
latter is not always a substitute for the former. 
Also in this Part we suggest generally that remittance responsibility 
for business or corporate remitters should be tied to the size of the 
remitter; that is, the larger the firm (in terms of gross revenue, profits, 
or assets), the stronger the argument for expanding their compulsory 
remittance responsibility. Moving beyond income taxes, our analysis 
explains why, under certain conditions, it will be more efficient to im­
pose in rem tax liability for property taxes (where the remittance obli­
gation is imposed, in effect, on a piece of property rather than on a 
person) rather than standard in personam liability and why nonstan­
dard withholding regimes, including so-called "reverse withholding,'' 
under which remittance responsibility is triggered by any commercial 
interaction with difficult-to-tax parties, can achieve the desired level 
and distribution of tax collection at the lowest possible overall cost. 
We conclude by considering some qualifications to our analysis, in­
cluding behavioral, political economy, and transition issues. One 
qualification deserves a mention at the outset: Our analysis ignores 
international, or more generally cross-jurisdictional, issues. That is, 
we assume that all of the relevant parties, all of the parties to whom 
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the tax (or, for that matter, tort) remittance obligation might conceiv­
ably be assigned are within the relevant jurisdiction. As our analysis 
shows the importance of the assignment of remittance responsibility, 
the existence of jurisdictional borders beyond which remittance re­
sponsibility may not be assigned is a serious complication. Moreover, 
the possibility of parties avoiding remittance responsibility by locating 
outside of the relevant jurisdiction obviously presents a serious prob­
lem for any regime of tax (or tort) enforcement. 
II. A PRIMER ON CoAsE: FARMERS, RANCHERS, AND 
OTHER "NEIGHBORS" 
The Coase Theorem makes what now seems like an obvious point: 
In a world with zero transaction costs, the initial assignment of a legal 
right or entitlement will not affect the allocation of resources, because 
the affected parties will always bargain to the efficient result, so long 
as everyone involved is rational (in the way that economists normally 
mean that term) and the entitlement in question is alienable (that is, 
the entitlement can be transferred). Before exploring this conclusion, 
it is useful to clarify what is meant by the term "legal entitlement" in 
this context. In general, the Coasean logic has been applied to situa­
tions in which the action of one party causes some harm or imposes 
some cost on another party-the classic negative externality.23 The 
entitlement at issue, then, is the right to avoid negative consequences 
of the action: either the right of "the injurer" to impose the cost on 
others or the right of "the victim" to prevent the harm or to insist on 
compensation for it.24 
The quintessential example of the Coase Theorem in action, from 
Coase himself, involves conflicting land uses, specifically neighboring 
landowners, a cattle rancher and a corn farmer.25 The Coasean ques­
tion, then, is who, as between the farmer and the rancher, should be 
legally responsible for the crop damage caused when the rancher's 
cows happen to trespass on the farmer's property and damage his 
23 Of course, a symmetrical Coasean story can be told for positive externalities, where 
the externality is not a cost or harm but some benefit that is bestowed unintentionally by 
one party on another. In those settings too, if transaction costs are zero, people are ra­
tional, and entitlements are freely tradable, parties will bargain to the efficient result. Fol­
lowing the literature, we tend to focus on negative externalities. 
24 If the victim (the party who suffers the harm in the first instance) is given the entitle­
ment to be free from harm, a second issue is what sort of rule would be used to protect that 
entitlement: a property rule or a liability rule. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1089 (1972). If the entitlement is protected by a property rule, the victim has the legal 
right to obtain an injunction to stop the harm-causing activity in question. If it is protected 
by a liability rule, the victim's legal remedies are limited to an ex post suit for damages. 
25 Coase, note 1, at 2-8. 
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corn.26 Or, put in terms of this Article's framework, who should be 
assigned the remittance obligation with respect to the crop damage 
caused by any cattle that stray onto the farmer's property. If the 
rancher is legally required to remit to the farmer an amount of money 
equal to his corn damage, we would say that the entitlement rests with 
the farmer and the remittance obligation with the rancher. And if the 
rancher is not required to remit the money for any harm caused by his 
straying cows on the farmer's property, we would say that the remit­
tance obligation rests with the farmer (and the legal entitlement with 
the rancher).27 
What Coase demonstrated was that, in a frictionless world, it does 
not matter (from an efficiency perspective) how the legal entitlement 
(or remittance obligation) is assigned.28 The efficient, joint wealth­
maximizing outcomes will eventually be reached through a process 
that is now sometimes referred to as "Coasean bargaining." If it is 
efficient to produce cattle but not corn on two adjoining pieces of 
property, or the reverse, the neighboring landowners will bargain to 
that result.29 And they will do so whether the entitlement is placed 
with the farmer or with the rancher. If efficiency calls for both corn 
and cattle to be produced but for a fence to be erected between the 
two properties, then that is what will happen, and it will happen in the 
most efficient way possible, with the parties agreeing that the best 
fence builder should do the job.30 This is Calabresi's cheapest-cost 
26 Id. at 2. 
27 Of course, however the remittance obligation for the costs of damaged corn is allo­
cated between farmer and rancher, the actual economic burden of this obligation may then 
be "passed on" to the farmer's employees or customers, or to those of the ranchers, de­
pending on, among other things, the relative elasticities of relevant supply and demand in 
those markets. This is unlikely to occur, though, if the legal assignment and subsequent 
bargains apply to just one rancher and farmer, as the prices of the commodities will be set 
in a much larger market. We have more to say about this sort of cost pass-through at text 
accompanying notes 28-40. 
28 See Coase, note 1, at 8. 
29 For example, imagine that the lost profit to the farmer of not being able to grow and 
sell his corn (should the rancher next door be given the entitlement to ignore the damage 
caused by his cattle) would be $100; and the cost to the rancher of not being able to have 
cattle would be $150 in lost profit. In that simple case, if the social planner were to give the 
entitlement initially to the rancher, the rancher would indeed decide to have cattle, letting 
them roam the countryside, and would make $150 of profit. The farmer, anticipating the 
rancher's behavior (and the potential damage to his crops), would opt not to plant corn 
and would thereby lose $100 of potential corn profit. So we would have cattle but not corn 
from these two landowners, and this, on the facts, would be the efficient result as it maxi­
mizes the joint benefit to the parties of their uses of their land net of costs. 
30 Imagine that in the previous example the farmer could build a fence for $75 that 
would make it possible for both the farmer to have his corn and the rancher to have her 
cattle but, for whatever reason, the rancher's cost of building a fence was much higher­
say, $200. Obviously, the parties under the Coasean assumptions would agree to have the 
farmer build the fence, and this would happen regardless of the initial assignment of enti-
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harm avoider idea, and the law can achieve this result in a Coasean 
world simply by setting the initial legal entitlements one way or the 
other and letting the parties negotiate. The same analysis can be ap­
plied to any negative externality: pollution, automobile accidents, 
whatever.31 As long as transaction costs are assumed to be zero (and 
everyone is rational), all affected parties will take part in the Coasean 
bargaining process; all externalities will be internalized. There will be 
the "right," or social-welfare-maximizing amount of the activity and 
all cost-justified investments in cost reduction will be made. In the 
torts literature, these latter two effects are known as activity-level ef­
f ects and the care-level effects. 32 
Numerous criticisms of the Coase Theorem have been advanced 
over the years, both of the efficiency proposition and the invariance 
proposition. Some scholars, for example, have pointed out that invari­
ance will not hold when there is a divergence between the amount a 
party is "willing to pay" to acquire an entitlement and the amount he 
is "willing to accept" to give up the same entitlement, due perhaps to 
the kind of endowment effect discussed in prospect theory.33 This 
kind of effect has been confirmed in empirical studies, and it can lead 
to invariance of outcomes-though not to inefficiency, assuming a 
world of zero transaction costs.34 In addition to the willing to pay/ 
willing to accept critique, there are game-theoretic objections to both 
the invariance and the efficiency propositions. Many of the paradig­
matic examples of Coasean bargaining involve situations that could 
give rise to strategic behavior by the parties, which may lead to a re­
sult that is not joint wealth maximizing. For example, if the interac-
tlements. (In the example, so long as a fully effective fence could be built for less than 
$250 (the total combined profit of farming and ranching), then the fence would be built.) 
This conclusion follows from the fact that having the farmer build the fence would produce 
the highest joint value from the two properties. ($150 cattle profit + $100 corn profit - $75 
fence cost= $175.) In Calabresi's famous phrasing, the farmer in this situation would be 
the "cheapest cost avoider" and therefore, under Coasean assumptions, would end up with 
the responsibility for building the fence. In this Article we use the term cheapest-cost or 
least-cost harm avoider in cases where the private costs are also social costs; we use the 
term cheapest- or least-cost liability avoiders in cases where the private costs are not social 
costs or, in particular, when the private benefits of tax avoidance do not correspond to 
social benefits. This is just another way of illustrating that, in the absence of transaction 
costs, the parties will internalize all external costs and therefore will take all cost-justified 
measures to reduce those costs. And the same bargaining that will assign the entitlement 
to the party with the highest-valued use will also ensure that the party who is best able to 
reduce the size of the negative externality (the cheapest-cost harm avoider) will do so. It is 
all part of the Coasean bargain. 
31 See, e.g., Polinsky, note 8, at 43-56, 108-23. 
32 See Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Accident Law 26 (1987). 
33 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Marginal Utility and the Coase Theorem, 75 Cornell 
L. Rev. 783, 799 (1990). 
34 Id. 
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tions between the parties are modeled as a noncooperative game with 
asymmetric information, strategic behavior of various sorts may pre­
vent an efficient outcome.35 This is sometimes referred to as the bar­
gaining problem or the problem of bilateral monopoly.36 Some 
commentators argue that the bilateral monopoly critique fails to take 
seriously the zero-transaction cost assumption, which includes an as­
sumption of perfect information on both sides (including information 
about the payoffs to each side of all possible outcomes).37 Under 
those assumptions, bargaining failures would not occur. But even so, 
it can hardly be denied that in many real-world settings between two 
(or relatively few) bargaining parties some value-maximizing out­
comes are not achieved, either because of transaction costs ( conven­
tionally understood) or by strategic behavior; and the relevance of the 
Coase Theorem to those situations can reasonably be questioned. 
Notably the traditional Coasean bargaining situation involves con­
flicting land uses in which there is no prior contractual relationship 
between the two parties. The injurer and the victim are not in a con­
tractual seller-buyer relationship with each other. Rather, they are 
just neighbors, and their separate activities happen to conflict in the 
sense that, because the activities take place in close proximity to each 
other, a particular external cost arises, the remittance obligation for 
which needs to be assigned, explicitly or implicitly. The same would 
be true for the property owner whose manufacturing business pollutes 
the neighbors' air or water. In that case, the pollution would not arise 
out of the transaction between the manufacturer and its consumer/ 
neighbors, but is unrelated to any such transaction. 
There are two interesting implications from this noncontractual set­
ting. First, unlike a competitive market where the market price is set 
by the intersection of supply and demand, in a classic Coasean con­
flicting land-use situation the distribution of the gains from trade is 
determined by bargaining between the parties. Thus, assuming some 
sort of bargain is reached (and the bilateral monopoly problem over­
come), the distribution of the gains from trade will depend on the par­
ties' relative bargaining positions.38 The other interesting implication 
35 Donald H. Regan, The Problem of Social Cost Revisited, 15 J.L. & Econ. 427 (1972). 
36 See Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jules L. Coleman, The Philosophy of Law: An Introduction 
to Jurisprudence 258-62 (1984). 
37 Harold Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter?, 1 J. Legal Stud. 223 
(1972); Jeffrey F. Jaffe, The "Coase Theorem": A Reexamination-Comment, 89 Q.J. 
Econ. 660 (1976). 
38 Continuing with the example of the farmer and rancher who are neighbors (and 
whose land uses are incompatible), imagine what would happen in a Coasean world if the 
"entitlement" not to remit is given to the farmer. Given that the rancher can make $150 
ranching, and the farmer only $100 farming, the rancher presumably will pay the farmer to 
purchase his entitlement-that is, pay him to remit. Thus, the efficient outcome would be 
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of the standard Coasean noncontractual setting is that, precisely be­
cause these are bargaining situations, the assignment of the legal enti­
tlement to one side or the other will have distributional consequences. 
We call this insight the Coasean distributional variance proposition.39 
The point is that having the legal right to impose costs onto your 
neighbor, or the legal right to prevent your neighbor from imposing 
costs onto you, is itself a distinct and valuable asset. Thus, if the rule 
has always has been that ranchers are entitled to let their cattle roam 
the countryside, switching the entitlement to farmers would cause a 
drop in the value of the affected ranches relative to the affected farms. 
In effect, one of the costs of farming would have disappeared and 
reappeared as a cost of ranching. Such a change in legal rules would 
be akin to a lump sum transfer from farmers to ranchers. The same 
analysis could be applied to the example of the polluting manufac­
turer. If manufacturers suddenly become responsible for the pollution 
they impose on their neighbors, the manufacturing business would 
then be less profitable and precisely by the amount of the expected 
value of the cost of pollution or pollution abatement. Likewise, the 
value of owning a car is somewhat less if the owner has to pay for 
injuries to pedestrians than if he does not. 
These distributional consequences are diminished to the extent the 
affected assets of the parties are costlessly convertible to another 
equally profitable use or, conversely, that free entry into an industry 
dissipates the long-run gain in profits that would otherwise accrue to 
those already in business.40 Moreover, to the extent the harm in ques­
tion can be prevented with a trivial investment on the part of either 
party, the distributional consequences of the assignment will be simi­
larly trivial. For example, in the extreme case, if ranch land could just 
as easily be used for farming (say the land is equally profitable put to 
either use such that the choice to farm or ranch was virtually a matter 
of indifference to the landowner), and assuming zero costs of con­
verting from one to the other, there would be no distributional effect 
of altering the entitlement at issue. When the rule changed and ranch­
ers were required to corral their cattle or pay for the damage caused, 
the rancher could simply switch to farming. Of course, if ranchland is 
achieved. The precise amount the rancher would end up paying the farmer is impossible to 
determine ex ante. It would fall somewhere between $100 and $150, with the exact amount 
depending on the relative bargaining power of the two parties. 
39 As we discuss below, the Coasean distributional variance proposition does not apply 
in competitive market settings where the harm (or the tax) in question arises out of a 
contractual market transaction. See text accompanying notes 51-56. 
40 This argument would not apply if the change in entitlement applied to just one adja­
cent farmer and rancher pair; in this case it would be capitalized into the value of one or 
the other ongoing concerns. 
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not costlessly convertible to farmland or if the farmer has made ranch­
ing-specific investments in livestock or equipment, then a change in 
the rule would affect the value of the rancher's assets. The same 
would be true on the farmer side of things, as the value of farming­
specific investments would presumably rise. We could tell the same 
story in the other direction, with farmers losing value and ranchers 
gaining; or we could substitute any other example of a negative exter­
nality for that the rancher/farmer scenario. Hence, if a polluter could 
cheaply make some change in their operations that would eliminate 
the resulting pollutants, then the polluter's entitlement to impose 
costs on its neighbor would not be worth very much. And so on. Of 
course, notwithstanding this caveat, there will be substantial activity­
specific investments on one side or the other in many situations such 
that distributional variance in these types of situations is a nontrivial 
possibility. 
III. THE MARKET SETTING: SELLERS, BUYERS, AND INJURED 
THIRD PARTIES 
A. Efficiency and Distributive Invariance: Assuming Zero (or 
Homogeneous) Compliance and Administrative Costs 
To move the analysis one step closer to our analogy between torts 
and tax, we shift from the nonmarket "neighbor" setting to the long­
run equilibrium of a market setting involving numerous buyers and 
sellers transacting over a homogeneous product in which no buyer or 
seller has market power.41 Thus, imagine that there are two classes of 
parties who are buyers and sellers with respect to each other; and sup­
pose further that the production or consumption of the good or ser­
vice sometimes harm third parties. For example, the sellers could be 
makers of component parts that are sold to buyers who use those 
parts to manufacture a final product, which is then sold to retail cus­
tomers-some of whom end up being injured by the product. Alter­
natively, the sellers could be manufacturers of products that are sold 
to consumers who sometimes use the products in ways that injure 
third parties. For the purpose of illustration, for now we presume that 
the market in question is a labor market and that the buyers are em­
ployers and the sellers are workers. The problem, then, is that these 
labor market transactions not only produce value for the parties in­
volved (in terms of wages paid for services received and employer 
41 Although these competitive market assumptions are useful for purposes of illustra­
tion, as they allow us to construct simple supply and demand curves to demonstrate our 
basic points of efficiency and distributional invariance, these assumptions are not necessary 
to produce the invariance results. 
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business profits) , they also sometimes cause external harms to third 
parties.42 Suppose for now that these harms arise within the workers' 
"scope of employment," in the sense that the harm can reasonably be 
said to be in connection with the job that the worker is doing for the 
employer. Imagine also that transactions costs between employers 
and workers are relatively low; that is, because we have a competitive 
labor market, we assume that employers and workers reach joint­
wealth-maximizing employment contracts. We also assume, however, 
that the third-party victims are not part of this competitive labor mar­
ket and that transaction costs prevent them from engaging in Coasean 
bargaining with either the employers or workers whose interaction 
generates the harm. The third parties can do nothing to reduce this 
expected harm. Either employers or the workers can take steps to 
reduce or eliminate the expected harm that their joint actions impose 
on third parties, but neither is a "cheaper-cost harm avoider" than the 
other; that is, the cost to either of them per amount of reduction in 
expected harm is the same. In addition, we ignore the consequences 
of the harm to the third parties, as we are focusing only on the deter­
rence or cost internalization function of liability law.43 Finally, assume 
that the administrative costs associated with employer or worker lia­
bility are equal. (We have more to say on this assumption below.)44 
Now we have a classic negative externality, and the relevant policy 
question is to whom we should assign the remittance responsibility for 
this third-party harm: the workers (the sellers of labor) or the em­
ployers (the buyers of labor).45 To answer these questions, we depict 
our hypothesized labor market in a series of standard supply-and-de­
mand diagrams. We start with the long-run equilibrium condition 
prior to the discovery that the buyer/seller transactions are causing 
harm to third parties. This market is described in Figure 1.  
42 Below we draw an analogy between these harms caused to third parties and taxes 
owed to the government. See discussion in Section 111.D. 
43 This approach can be justified if we imagine that all third-party victims are insured 
directly for these harms through first-party insurance policies and can recover directly from 
their insurers for the harm. In that case, the tort actions that shift these costs either to 
buyers or sellers of the product or service that caused the third-party harm would be 
brought in the form of subrogation suits by the first-party insurance companies. 
44 See discussion in Section 111.C. 
45 Notice that we do not consider imposing the cost on the third-party victim. This is 
because we have assumed that either employers or employees could efficiently reduce or 
eliminate the expected harm, but that the third parties could do nothing to affect the ex­
pected harm. Also, an implicit assumption here is that the only available regulatory re­
sponse is ex post liability for harm. In fact, as we discuss below, ex ante regulation is also 
an option; however, it is likely to be very costly, a fact that will obviously have implications 
for the choice of the optimal legal response to the externality. We return to this assump­
tion below. See Section III.C. 
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The aggregate demand curve in Figure 1, labeled D, shows for each 
price (or wage) the total quantity of units of labor that would be de­
manded by employers. The aggregate supply curve, labeled S, shows 
the aggregate quantity of units of labor supplied by employees at any 
given price. The equilibrium price is p0, because only at that price will 
supply equal demand, and therefore there will be no upward or down­
ward pressure on the wage. At the equilibrium, x0 units of labor will 
be provided by workers. The areas denoted by triangles CS and PS 
represent employer surplus and employee surplus, respectively, which 
is the total dollar value attributable to the ability to provide labor at 
the equilibrium wage and quantity. 
Now suppose that it is discovered that the particular activity that 
the employees are engaged in on behalf of the employer will on occa­
sion cause harm to third parties. The question then is whether that 
tort liability (the legal obligation to remit the tort damages to the in­
jured plaintiffs) should be assigned in general to employers or to the 
employees-and whether it matters. Put in classic Coasean terms: 
What difference does the assignment of this entitlement/obligation 
make if we assume zero transaction costs (as between employer and 
employee), full rationality, and free transferability of legal entitle­
ments? The answer is none, not even a distributional difference. This 
is because, given the Coasean assumptions, market forces will in the 
long run push employers and workers to reach the efficient result. 
What's more, because of the price nexus here between employers and 
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workers, the way in which this new external cost will be borne by the 
parties will depend entirely on the elasticities of supply and demand 
for the workers' labor and not at all on the initial assignment of the 
legal entitlement, that is, the remittance obligation. 
To illustrate this basic point, we add to our model a new cost, which 
we assume, for now, is equal to c per unit of labor sold no matter 
whether employers or workers are held liable. This assumption is 
built on two sub-assumptions. One, it entails an assumption that the 
cost rises proportionally with the aggregate amount of the good or 
service sold and consumed (here, labor). This assumption implies that 
the cost can be represented by either a parallel shift in the supply or 
demand curve in the figures below. Two, it entails the assumption dis­
cussed above that neither employers nor workers are cheaper-cost 
harm avoiders than the other. That the per-unit cost of liability is c, 
whether employers or workers are assigned remittance responsibility, 
also implies that employers and workers have the same risk prefer­
ences or the same costs of purchasing liability insurance. With these 
new assumptions, Figure 2 depicts the situation in which the obliga­
tion to remit the cost of third-party injuries is assigned to workers, the 















Because the remittance obligation for this per-unit cost is legally 
assigned to workers, it means that, at whatever price they would have 
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required to provide any given output of labor previously, they now 
require a price that is c higher. This fact is represented by a parallel 
upward shift in the labor supply curve by a distance of c. The new 
supply curve is labeled S', which means that, at any quantity of labor 
provided, the height of S' represents the wage received by workers 
that would have to be necessary to induce this output. The height of S 
at any given output represents what the worker would receive for la­
bor, net of the new cost c, if that much labor were sold. After the 
introduction of this new cost, the new long-run equilibrium wage paid 
by employers is p1 and the equilibrium output is x1; the wage net of the 
cost is qi, which is equal to p1 - c. 
Because there is a new cost that has been introduced into this mar­
ket, it should not be a surprise that there is a loss of social welfare, 
which is represented by the decline in overall worker and employer 
surplus, shown as the area EBCF in Figure 2. The question now is, 
given the particular assignment of remittance obligations (here to 
workers), who actually bears the burden of the cost, where by "bear­
ing the burden" we again mean whose welfare or utility is reduced as a 
result of this new cost.46 The naiVe answer would be that the workers 
bear the cost, because they are legally responsible for remittance. 
However, because of the change in the prices of labor caused by the 
increased cost that shifts the supply curve, and because of the diver­
gence between the wage rate paid by the employer (p1) and the wage 
net of cost received by the worker (q1) in the new equilibrium, the 
allocation of the economic burden of the new cost is not determined 
by the assignment of the remittance obligation. Rather, it is deter­
mined by the elasticities of supply and demand for the workers' labor. 
To see this point, refer again to Figure 2. How the discovery of the 
new labor cost will affect the welfare of workers and employers is ap­
proximated by the change in employer and worker surplus, respec­
tively .47 The decline in employer surplus is the area IEBJ, which 
represents the loss of utility to employers due to the increased price 
for labor and the reduced consumption of labor. IEBJ is equal to the 
rectangle !ELI (which is (p1 p0)x1-or the portion of the aggregate 
cost of third-party risk borne by employers at the new equilibrium 
quantity) plus the triangle EBL (which is the loss of value to employ­
ers resulting from the reduction in the quantity purchased). By simi-
46 The loss of total surplus in Figure 2 is the area EBCF; this is the sum of EGCF, the 
cost c times actual output xl, or cxl, and the area EBG, which represents the social cost of 
forgoing the output xO - xl. As shown later, the triangle is analogous to the classic dead­
weight loss, or Harberger, triangle that is well-known in tax analysis. See generally Arnold 
C. Harberger, The Measurement of Waste, 54 Am. Econ. Rev. 58 (1964). 
47 Here employer and worker surplus are just specific cases of consumer and producer 
surplus. 
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lar logic, the loss in worker surplus is JBGK, which is due to the 
reduction in the net-of-cost price of the amount of labor produced, 
JLGK,48 and the loss of value to workers from the reduction in quan­
tity of labor supplied, the triangle LBG. The divergence between the 
equilibrium wage paid by the employer (p1) and the equilibrium net­
of-harm-related-cost price received by the worker (q1) is key here. 
The extent to which these two prices will diverge from the original 
equilibrium price (p0) that prevailed prior to the discovery of the new 
cost, will determine how this new cost affects the welfare of employers 
and workers. This "split" of the new cost in turn depends on the rela­
tive elasticity of supply and demand: the higher the relative elasticity 
of demand for labor is (that is, the flatter the curve), the lower (p1 - p0) 
will be relative to (p0 - q1), and the lower the relative burden borne by 
the employers will be. The same point could be made about supply: 
the more elastic the supply of labor, the lower will be (p0 - q1) relative 
to (p1 p0). In sum, as between workers and employers, the (rela­
tively) more elastic party-the one with better alternatives to this par­
ticular employment relationship-will bear less of the economic 
burden of the new third-party liability. 
Now for the invariance point mentioned in the Introduction. The 
distribution of the economic burden imposed by these new costs of 
third-party liability between sellers and buyers (workers and employ­
ers here) will depend on the relative elasticities, and that distribu­
tional outcome will be invariant to the assignment of the initial legal 
obligation. This point is illustrated by changing the example to assign 
to employers rather than workers the legal obligation to remit the cost 
of the third-party liability. Figure 3 shows the results. 
The value of labor to employers, net of the new liability cost, is 
unchanged; therefore, the D curve still represents the willingness to 
pay net of this cost. The price employers are willing to pay, however, 
is less than before. Thus, instead of a shift in supply, we have a down­
ward shift in the demand curve, from D to D', by an amount equal to 
the new liability cost, c. The new demand curve intersects the supply 
curve at point G, and q1 is the new equilibrium price paid to the work­
ers. The total cost to the employer is qi + c, which is equal to p1• 
Comparing Figure 3 to Figure 2, we see that everything is the same, 
including the total wage paid by employers, the price received by 
workers, and the quantity of labor. Both the employer surplus and 
the worker surplus are the same in both situations, as is the loss of 
surplus caused by the discovery of the new liability cost. In Figure 3 
the lost surplus is the area ABGH, which is exactly equal to area 
48 This is calculated simply by multiplying the change in the price received by producers 
(pO - ql) by the new equilibrium quantity produced, xl. 
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FEBC in Figure 2, and both are equal to cx1 + EBG. The incidence 
and efficiency consequences are identical. 
B. Differential Prevention Costs: The Least-Cost Harm Avoider 
Note that the invariance result just described remains unchanged if 
we relax the assumption that neither party is a cheaper-cost harm 
avoider than the other, so long as we maintain the Coasean assump­
tions of zero transaction costs as between buyer and seller and the 
free transferability of interests. Imagine, for example, that workers 
happen to be the cheaper-cost harm avoiders, such that the per-unit 
cost to them of being assigned legal responsibility for third-party 
harms is not c but the smaller c'; whereas the cost of third-party liabil­
ity remains c for employers.49 Thus, were it not for the Coase Theo-
49 Thus, we are assuming for simplicity that either the employee can take steps to reduce 
the third-party accident risk or the employer can do so, but not both simultaneously. Thus, 
the question is which of them should be given assigned the legal responsibility for the full 
harm. In many situations, of course, it will be optimal for both the employer and the 
employee to make investments in "care" (expenditures to reduce the expected costs of 
third-party harm). In such situations, there is no single cheapest-cost harm avoider. This 
complication will not matter in a contractual setting in which buyers and sellers, through 
their Coasean interactions with each other, can create incentives for both parties to take 
optimal care. We use the cheapest-cost harm avoider example for ease of exposition. We 
also assume that the only possible liability rule is strict liability for third-party harm, which 
will be imposed either on employers or employees. The analysis could also be applied to 
fault-based liability rules. 
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rem, one might conclude, by a comparison of Figure 4 and Figure 3, 
that the overall loss of social welfare caused by third-party liability 
would be lower if the legal obligation were assigned to workers. Not 
so, under Coase. That is, even if the remittance obligation were im­
posed initially on employers, competition would induce workers to of­
fer to assume liability for the third-party harm (and to purchase 
insurance for the risk at cost c'), which employers would accept, be­
cause the c' is by assumption lower than the cost, c, of the employers' 
purchasing insurance against the risk on their own. Thus, no matter 
how the initial legal obligation is assigned, with frictionless transfera­
bility the remittance obligation between employer and worker (be­
tween buyer and seller) would end up in the efficient place: on 
workers. And we would end up with Figure 4.50 Obviously, the same 
sort of analysis could be done if the employer were the least-cost harm 
avoider, in which case, regardless of the law's assignment of tort liabil­
ity, we would expect the parties to agree to employment contracts that 
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This invariance conclusion, of course, does not imply that the as­
sigriment of the legal responsibility for third-party liability is irrelevant 
in a world with high transaction costs (as between employer and em-
so In Figure 4, the reduction in equilibrium output is smaller compared to Figure 2 or 
Figure 3. The increase in the wage paid is less, as is the decline in the wage received by the 
worker. Finally, the social cost is lower, being equal to F'E'BC, or c'xl' + E'BG'. 
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ployee) or in a world in which legal entitlements are nontransferable. 
For example, if we imagine that transaction costs are high, the effi­
cient result would be to assign the responsibility for third-party liabil­
ity to the least-cost harm avoider-whichever party faced cost c' 
rather than c-assuming the policymaker can determine with relative 
ease who that is.51 If that happens to be the workers, the most effi­
cient assignment of legal responsibility would entail worker liability; if 
the employer, however, is the least-cost harm avoider, then the rule 
should be employer liability. This is just standard Calabresi. Like­
wise, even if transaction costs are low as between the market partici­
pants whose transactions produce the third-party harm, if we imagine 
that the legal entitlement in question will be made nontransferable, 
then the initial legal rule will matter. Thus, for example, if workers 
are the least-cost avoiders of third-party harm (that is, the cost would 
be c' for workers and c for employers) and we place the legal responsi­
bility on employers, and (importantly) we make that legal assignment 
nontransferable, then the parties will be made worse off. Indeed, 
even workers, the likely intended beneficiaries of such a rule, may be 
made worse off. 52 
C. Dif erential Administrative Costs: Insolvent Defendants, 
Least-Cost Liability Avoider 
In the last Section we concluded that, in a situation in which a 
buyer-seller market transaction gives rise to a third-party harm, it 
would be optimal to assign the legal responsibility for the third-party 
harm to the least-cost harm avoider, as between the buyer and the 
seller, assuming (among other things) that the cost of identifying the 
latter is relatively low.53 In this Section we address an important qual­
ification to that conclusion. This qualification concerns the relative 
administrative costs of various alternative forms of regulation, as com­
pared with the cost of the negative externality at issue. For example, 
consider how the analysis changes if the least-cost harm avoider is 
judgment-proof; that is, the least-cost harm avoider does not have as­
sets sufficient to cover the potential tort liability and therefore, to the 
extent of the excess, will ignore the threat of ex post liability. 
51 More specifically, assuming the cost of identifying the cheapest-cost harm avoider is 
lower than the cost savings from moving from c to c'. 
52 Craswell, note 18, at 362, 369-70. 
53 We are assuming that the third-party victim can do nothing to reduce the risk of harm 
and is fully insured against the consequences of the harm. Given that information is costly, 
it may be impossible at reasonable cost for the social planner to determine who the cheap­
est-cost harm avoider is. That is, both c and c' may not be cost-justifiably observable by the 
legal authority. If that is the case, then the assignment of the obligation has to be made on 
some other basis. 
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To see how this new assumption alters the analysis, also assume that 
workers are the least-cost harm avoiders. But imagine that they are 
entirely judgment-proof. This is an extreme example, but it is not ut­
terly fanciful. If the only assets the workers have are the equity in 
their primary residences and their retirement accounts-assets that 
are to some extent protected from tort creditors under state bank­
ruptcy laws-they would indeed be largely judgment-proof.S4 In that 
case, although the workers may be the least-cost harm avoiders, they 
are also the least-cost liability avoiders. Being the cheaper-cost liabil­
ity avoiders, however, makes them decidedly not the overall least-cost 
alternative in terms of total social costs. To the contrary, in such a 
situation, the overall cost to the plaintiff (or to the legal system in 
general) of forcing the judgment-proof workers (and hence, through 
the price mechanism, employers) to internalize third-party harm 
would likely be extremely high. The reason is that policymakers 
would have to resort to some other form of regulation, such as ex ante 
command-and-control supervision of the worker's conduct, which is a 
type of regulation that in many situations is considered to be more 
expensive than simple ex post liability.ss In such a situation, the com­
bined private compliance and public administrative costs associated 
with internalizing the third-party harm to the workers might well ex­
ceed the harm to the third-party. In a sense, therefore, the so-called 
judgment-proof problem can be seen as an administrative- or en­
forcement-cost problem. 
Because of this judgment-proof/administrative-cost problem, if im­
posing liability on the least-cost harm avoider (here, the worker) were 
the only ex post liability option, the efficient result might simply be no 
liability (that is, to leave the costs on the victims). However, that is 
not the only ex post liability option. It is also possible to impose the 
tort remittance responsibility on the next least-cost harm avoider­
here the employers. And if employers are not judgment-proof, it may 
generate lower overall social cost to impose liability on them rather 
54 Some states limit the bankruptcy exemption available for retirement accounts and for 
primary residences. See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 4914 (exempting only $75,000 eq­
uity in a principal residence with no exemption for an IRA); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 235, 
§ 34A (LexisNexis 2010) (excluding deposits into the retirement account within five years 
of declaration of bankruptcy in excess of 7% of debtor's total income). 
55 It is generally thought that, where the judgment-proof problem is not present, ex post 
liability is a cheaper way of internalizing negative externalities, unless we believe that regu­
lators are likely to know more about the relevant risks than the parties involved. The 
informational burden on the regulator of the ex post liability system is considered rela­
tively low compared with ex ante regulation. See Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Versus 
Negligence, 9 J. Legal Stud. 1 (1980); see also Donald Wittman, Prior Regulation vs. Post 
Liability: The Choice Between Input and Output Monitoring, 6 J. Legal Stud. 193 (1977). 
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than either (1) to impose liability on the workers, (2) to engage in ex 
ante regulation, or (3) to leave the costs on the plaintiffs. 
To see this point, go back to the example and assume that if workers 
are assigned the third-party liabilities (and they are not judgment­
proof), the per-unit cost of that liability is represented by c'; whereas, 
if the liability is assigned to employers the per-unit cost would be the 
larger cost, c. Thus, workers in this case are the least-cost harm 
avoiders. If, however, employees are judgment-proof (requiring very 
expensive ex ante regulation to internalize the cost of third-party 
harms to this market), and if we include the administrative cost as part 
of the overall social cost, then the full cost of internalizing the third­
party harm would not be c' but c", which is, by assumption, even 
larger than c. In this situation, overall social welfare will be maxi­
mized by imposing liability on employers, who are, again, the next­
least-cost harm avoiders. 
A version of the foregoing argument-the combination of the least­
cost harm avoider story and the judgment-proof defendant story-is 
in fact the standard economic rationale for the tort concept of vicari­
ous liability.56 "Vicarious liability" in the most general sense means to 
hold one party strictly liable for the tort committed by another. The 
primary justification for this sort of secondary liability indeed builds 
on the idea that the former party may have some effective control 
over the harm caused by the latter and may be more amenable to 
regulation by ex post liability. Thus, under the general legal doctrine 
of respondeat superior, whenever an agent, who is under the control 
of a principal, commits a tort against a third party, the principal may 
be held liable for the third-party harm, assuming the agent committed 
the tort while acting within the scope of the agency relationship.57 
Applying this principle to the employment context, if an employee, 
while acting within the scope of her employment role, commits a tort 
and causes a harm to some third party, the injured party can sue either 
the employee directly for negligence or the employer vicariously, as­
suming the plaintiff can establish the elements of a tort claim (duty, 
breach, harm, and causation) against the employee. In most cases, of 
course, the third party will sue both the employer and the employee, 
who can be held jointly and severally liable for the employee's tort.58 
56 Alan 0. Sykes, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of 
Agency, 91 Yale L.J. 168 (1981); Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the 
Choice Between Enterprise and Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 1345 
(1982); Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 1231 (1984); 
Shavell, note 32; Reinier H. Kraakman, Vicarious and Corporate Civil Liability, in 2 Ency­
clopedia of Law and Economics, note 2, at 669, 670-71. 
57 Restatement (Third) of Agency, §§ 2.04, 7.01-7.08 (2006). 
58 See Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts 1078 (2000). 
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Once a judgment is secured against both parties, the plaintiff can then 
seek to enforce it against either defendant, or partly against one and 
partly against the other, whatever is most expedient.59 And if the em­
ployer is the only party who is not judgment-proof (either because the 
employer is the only party with sufficient assets to cover the liability 
or the only party with adequate liability insurance coverage), the judg­
ment typically will be enforced against the employer. If the employer 
is liable only vicariously (and not as a result of its own separate tort, 
such as negligence), then traditionally the employer would be allowed 
to seek "indemnity" from the employee.60 Interestingly, however, the 
right of indemnification from employees is not often invoked, perhaps 
because employers are, in effect, acting as the liability insurers of their 
employees. 61 
The two primary efficiency justifications for vicarious liability of 
employers for the torts of their employees involve either a least-cost 
harm avoider type of argument (on the theory that employers will 
often be in a better position than the employees to take cost-effective 
steps to minimize the relevant expected harms) or a judgment-proof 
or "deep-pocket" type of story.62 And the two arguments work to­
gether in the way that is similar to the framework set out in this Arti­
cle, although prior analyses of this question have not emphasized the 
importance of comparative administrative costs. Thus, a case can be 
made that in many situations the employer will be, if not the least-cost 
harm avoider, a cheaper-cost harm avoider than the plaintiff. Moreo­
ver, employees will often be partially or fully judgment-proof with re­
spect to a potential tort judgment and thus partially if not totally 
nonresponsive to the threat of legal liability, thus strengthening the 
case for employer vicarious liability. 
Similar arguments can be made for other types of vicarious liability. 
For example, vicarious liability can also be imposed jointly and sever­
ally on all of the partners in a joint enterprise for the tort of any other 
partner acting within the scope of the partnership.63 In a more ex-
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 1079. In other sorts of joint-and-several liability tort actions, where the defend­
ants are not merely being held vicariously liable but are themselves legally responsible at 
least in part for the tortious harm, then rather than indemnification, the defendant who is 
forced to pay the judgment can seek "contribution" for the fair shares owed by the other 
defendants. Id. 
61 Indeed, employers typically purchase liability insurance that covers the run-of-the­
mill negligence torts committed by their employees within the scope of employment. If 
employers did start seeking indemnification from their employees for these torts, presuma­
bly employees would then begin to purchase their own separate workplace liability 
insurance. 
62 See sources cited in note 56. 
63 Dobbs, note 58, at 413. 
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treme example of vicarious liability, some scholars and lawyers have 
argued that gun manufacturers should be held vicariously liable for 
the injuries and deaths caused by gun violence.64 (Congress and the 
courts have rejected this argument.65) Joint-and-several liability 
sometimes is also imposed in cases that are not normally characterized 
as instances of vicarious liability where several parties contributed to a 
single plaintiff injury. In any event, the argument for joint-and-sev­
eral liability in these contexts (whether vicarious or not) can be put in 
efficiency, cost-internalization terms that should at this point be 
familiar. 
Consider the hand-gun example again, which, though extreme, 
makes the point: Even if gun-toting criminals are in some sense the 
least-cost harm avoiders with respect to gun violence, they are also 
often judgment-proof. What's more, individuals who are likely to use 
guns to intentionally harm others are also often likely to expend con­
siderable effort to avoid detection, which further raises the adminis­
trative costs of enforcing the tort liability against them. By contrast, 
the manufacturers of the guns that are used in those crime, if given the 
proper incentive, may be able to do something at relatively low cost 
(even if not the "lowest possible cost") to reduce the risk of harm due 
to gun violence, perhaps by redesigning the guns or by altering the 
way in which they are distributed. That is the care-level argument. 
The activity-level argument would be similar: If we assume that gun 
makers are solvent whereas criminal gun users are not (or that, more 
generally, it is less expensive administratively to enforce the liability 
on gun makers than criminal gun users), then shifting liability vicari­
ously to the manufacturers could have beneficial activity-level effects, 
as gun prices would adjust upward to reflect a larger share of the over­
all social costs associated with gun sales. 
We should also emphasize here an important limitation on vicarious 
employer liability. As mentioned above, under the doctrine of re­
spondeat superior, the employer is liable only for those torts commit­
ted by employees while acting within the scope of employment.66 
64 E.g., Rachana Bhowmik, Aiming for Accountability: How City Lawsuits Can Help 
Reform an Irresponsible Gun Industry, 11 J.L. & Pol'y 67 (2002); Paul R. Bonney, Manu­
facturers' Strict Liability for Handgun Injuries: An Economic Analysis, 73 Geo. L.J. 1437 
(1985); Timothy D. Lytton, Tort Claims Against Gun Manufacturers for Crime-Related 
Injuries: Defining a Suitable Role for the Tort System in Regulating the Firearms Industry, 
65 Mo. L. Rev. 1, 2, 7-8 (2000). 
65 In 2005 Congress enacted the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act, which 
exempts gun manufacturers and dealers from being held liable for crimes committed by 
people using guns. Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095 (2005) (codified as 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7901-03 (2006) ). 
66 The classic discussion of the scope-of-employment doctrine is Young B. Smith, Frolic 
and Detour, 23 Colum. L. Rev. 444 (1923). 
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(And as we discuss below, an efficiency argument can be made for 
expanding that liability to include independent contractors as well, at 
least in situations in which contractors are likely to be judgment­
proof.67) Thus, if the worker causes harm while engaging in some ac­
tivity that has nothing to do with his employment relationship with the 
employer, the employer cannot be held vicariously liable for that loss. 
The rationale for this so-called "scope-of-employment doctrine" is 
straightforward: Whereas it might make sense to force the cost of any 
harm that is caused by an enterprise to be borne by that enterprise 
and (through the price mechanism) the parties who benefit from that 
enterprise, the same argument does not apply to costs that are not 
caused by the enterprise.68 The scope-of-employment doctrine is an 
example of a more general point in tort law: For a tort defendant to 
be held liable for the harm of another party, the injured party must 
establish, among other things, a causal link between the harm and the 
defendant.69 
Much turns then on what counts as a causal link. Alan Sykes has 
argued that the appropriate definition of causation in the vicarious 
liability context is similar to the one that economists have argued for 
in other tort contexts: "The crucial variable in this analysis is the ex­
tent to which the employment relation increases the probability of 
each wrong."70 Thus he argues that "[a]n enterprise 'fully causes' the 
wrong of an employee if the dissolution of the enterprise and subse­
quent unemployment of the employee would reduce the probability of 
the wrong to zero. "71 If no such causal link exists between the 
worker's employment with the employer and the harm caused to the 
third party, then imposing liability for that cost on the employer 
would, he argues, be inefficient for two reasons. First, such an expan­
sion of vicarious liability would in effect tum the employer into the 
worker's general liability insurer, which is probably not the most effi­
cient risk-spreading arrangement.72 Second, such an allocation of lia­
bility, by imposing an arbitrary cost on the employer, would have the 
effect of inefficiently reducing the scale of the enterprise.73 To use an 
67 See text accompanying notes 79-81. 
68 This idea, sometimes referred to as "enterprise liability," can also be found in the 
early work of Calabresi. See Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and 
the Law of Torts, 70 Yale L.J. 499, 500 (1961). 
69 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 430 (1965). 
70 Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the 
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 563, 572 
(1988). 
71 Id. 
n Id. at 574-75. 
73 Id. at 575. Again, this notion of causation has been applied more generally to tort 
law. Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of 
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example outside of the employment context, it would be like making 
gun makers liable in tort not for the gun-related injuries caused by 
their customers, but for the auto-related injuries caused by their cus­
tomers. Why should those auto-accident costs be assigned to the gun­
manufacturing business merely because of the contractual nexus be­
tween the gun makers and the gun owners? 
The scope-of-employment doctrine viewed this way seems sensible 
enough. This is not to say, however, that vicarious liability beyond the 
scope of employment would never make sense. For example, if there 
are efficient care-level investments that the employer can easily make 
that would reduce the probability or severity of the harm to third­
parties caused by their employees outside of the scope of employment, 
and if transaction costs would prevent the parties from bargaining to 
this result on their own, then assigning liability for the worker's be­
yond-the-scope-of-employment harm to the employer might be effi­
cient. It is standard to assume that the cheapest-cost harm avoider is 
one of the parties who caused the harm in the traditional sense of the 
concept of causation, but that need not necessarily be the case. Put 
differently, even if the disappearance of the employer and the employ­
ment relationship would not reduce the expected cost of the harm to 
zero (which is another way of saying, even if the employer and the 
employment relationship is not a "but for" cause of the third-party 
harm), the employer conceivably could still be the cheapest-cost (or 
next-cheapest-cost) harm avoider. It is at least possible that the em­
ployer could take steps on its own to reduce the risk of third-party 
harm-even if the activity in question is outside the scope of employ­
ment. For example, the employer could condition some portion of the 
workers' pay on their not causing any torts to third parties, for which 
the employer will be liable.74 
Such a liability regime, where employers are held liable for (some) 
outside-the-scope-of-employment torts of their employees, could be 
thought of as a type of compulsory employer-provided general liabil­
ity insurance. Having employers' act as general liability insurers for 
Torts, 9 J. Legal Stud. 463, 468 (1980) ("One action is a probabilistic cause of a conse­
quence relative to another action if the probability of occurrence of the consequence is 
higher given the first action than given the second.") (citations omitted); see also Omri 
Ben-Shahar, Causation and Foreseeability, in 2 Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, note 
2, at 644, 645 ("Under the normative economic analysis, the proximate cause doctrine's 
designated role is to expand or shrink the scope of liability, in order to achieve efficient 
deterrence."). 
74 This idea is consistent with Calabresi's notion of assigning liability to the "best 
briber." See Calabresi, note 9, at 150-52. Calabresi argues that if it is difficult to identify 
the cheapest-cost avoider, it might be efficient to assign liability to the party best able to 
identify the cheapest cost avoider and then to bribe them to make efficient investments in 
accident avoidance. Id. 
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their workers (and not merely as workplace liability insurers, as they 
currently do) may not be efficient. But it might be. It is already the 
case that employers voluntarily provide health insurance for costs in­
curred by their employees that are unrelated to work, and some 
policymakers and experts (though obviously not all) believe that this 
is a sensible way of allocating health-care risks.75 A similar approach 
to outside-of-employment liability risks, therefore, should not be dis­
missed out of hand. Whether such a reform would in fact be a good 
idea is, of course, an empirical question that would require further 
investigation that is well beyond the scope of this Article.76 
None of this is to say that deep-pocket vicarious liability, whether 
limited to the scope of employment or not, will always be efficient. It 
depends on the comparison of the overall social costs (including the 
regulatory and administrative cost) of imposing and enforcing liability 
on either the buyer or seller (employer or employee, gun user or gun 
maker) or the cost of leaving the liability on the injured victims. 
Moreover, in situations in which the worker is fully solvent, worker 
liability is likely the most efficient outcome. That is, sometimes the 
workers will have the deeper pockets. But if we assume that workers 
are usually more likely to be judgment-proof and employers usually 
have the deeper pockets, and we assume further that ex ante regula­
tion of these sorts of risks is often extremely expensive, it seems likely 
that vicarious deep-pocket liability will often make sense, especially 
(as mentioned) in situations in which there are reasons to believe that 
the deep pocket also happens to be the least (or a relatively cheap) 
75 Thus, not only do employers remit premiums to purchase insurance that covers the 
risks associated with workplace injuries to their employees (that is, workers' compensation 
insurance), they also remit premiums to cover their employees' health-related risks that 
have little or nothing to do with the workplace. We cannot infer from the existence of this 
practice that it is necessarily efficient. After all, employer-provided health insurance has 
long been subsidized through the federal income tax laws. See IRC §§  105, 106. Still, that 
such a subsidy has been left in place for so many years suggests that policymakers must 
believe that the subsidy has had some beneficial effects. 
76 This argument suggests an immediate and obvious Coasean counter-argument: If the 
market does not already allocate these risks in this way (that is, employers do not already 
tend to provide their employees with general liability insurance as a fringe benefit), then 
why should the law require it? The failure of the market to provide such a benefit, in other 
words, could be seen as evidence of its efficiency. The problem with that argument, of 
course, is that it ignores the incentives-discussed immediately below-that employers and 
their workers have to structure their contractual arrangements so as to externalize such 
liability costs onto third parties. That is, even though it might be efficient in some situa­
tions to assign liability for outside-of-employment, worker-caused third-party harms to the 
employer, we should expect Coasean bargaining between employers and employees to 
push in the direction of assigning those liabilities to employees, who can benefit from their 
relatively greater chance of being judgment-proof when the time to comes to pay the piper. 
Such an arrangement could be joint wealth maximizing for employer and worker although 
socially wasteful. 
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cost harm avoider, as will often be the case in employer/employee re­
lationships-even if not in the gun maker/gun user case. In other situ­
ations, the balance of costs may cut in the other direction, or there 
may even be situations in which the employers rather than employees 
happen to be the judgment-proof parties, in which case the efficient 
result may then be employee rather than employer liability.77 We 
make an analogous point below with respect to tax remittance 
obligations.78 
It is also worth emphasizing that when and how to impose vicarious 
liability are complex questions that often present difficult line-drawing 
problems. For example, under respondeat superior, a principal is vi­
cariously liable for the torts of its agent only if the principal had the 
power to control the manner in which the agent did his job and only if 
the agent commits the tort within the scope of the agency relationship. 
In the employment context, these requirements are manifest in the 
common law distinction between "employees," who are subject to the 
control of the employer in how they do their work, and "independent 
contractors," who in theory are not.79 Thus, an employer can be held 
vicariously liable for the torts of its employees but not of independent 
contractors who have been hired to do a job. On its face this distinc­
tion is consistent with notions of efficient deterrence and least-cost 
harm avoider, in that the employer will only be liable if it is in a posi­
tion to control the worker's behavior. As soon as this sort of line is 
drawn, however, employers have an incentive to manipulate it, by hir­
ing independent contractors to do the work that otherwise (in the ab­
sence of this line in the doctrine) would have been done by employees 
or simply to characterize employees as contractors by ceding real or 
apparent control to the workers. Either strategy could limit the em­
ployer's liability. In addition, because of this distinction in tort law 
between employees and independent contractors, employers have an 
incentive to hire contractors who are judgment-proof, which enables 
77 Kornhauser, note 56. 
78 See discussion in Section IV.C. 
79 The definition of an employee for tort law and tax law purposes relies on the same 
multifactor common law test, which is designed to get at the question of control. See, e.g., 
Rev. Rul. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296: 
An individual is an employee for federal employment tax purposes if the 
individual has the status of an employee under the usual common law rules 
. . . .  [T]he relationship of employer and employee exists when the [employer 
has] the right to control and direct the [worker], not only as to the result to be 
accomplished by the work but also as to the details and means by which that 
result is accomplished. That is, an employee is subject to the will and control 
of the employer not only as to what work has to be done but also as to how it 
shall be done. In this connection, it is not necessary that the employer actually 
direct or control the manner in which the services are performed; it is sufficient 
if the employer has the right to do so. 
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the contractors to avoid liability and essentially allows the contracting 
parties-buyers and sellers-to externalize the third-party harm.80 
There are, to be sure, potential solutions to this problem. For exam­
ple, in situations in which workers have caused injuries to third par­
ties, courts, instead of relying on the manipulable distinction between 
employees and contractors, could simply hold the employers liable 
any time the employee is insolvent and the employer is both solvent 
and at least the next-least-cost harm avoider. Of course, if the em­
ployee is expected to be solvent, then a rule that holds the employee 
liable can make sense as well. s1 
It should also be noted that ex ante regulation and vicarious deep­
pocket liability are not the only possible solutions to the judgment­
proof problem. For example, some have suggested the possibility of 
making the judgment-proof party purchase liability insurance that 
fully covers the potential liability.82 For some situations this might be 
a plausible solution. For example, every state requires drivers either 
to purchase liability insurance or otherwise to demonstrate their "fi­
nancial responsibility" before they are allowed to register their auto­
mobile. 83 On the other hand, for other situations, compulsory liability 
insurance is impractical. And even in contexts where compulsory in­
surance is a realistic possibility, whether in general it will be efficient 
overall would depend on how the overall per unit cost of compulsory 
liability insurance (including the cost of administering such a system) 
would compare with the alternative costs of c, c', and c". 
A key lesson that emerges from this analysis is that in these settings 
Coasean bargaining will not always be welfare-enhancing and that 
sometimes it will be socially optimal to make legal entitlements or 
obligations nontransferable. Why so? Imagine that assigning liability 
for third-party harms to employers rather than to employees mini­
mized overall social costs (harm plus administrative cost) because em­
ployees are utterly judgment-proof and the next best alternative, ex 
ante regulation, is exorbitantly costly. In that situation, if we assigned 
80 Jennifer H. Arlen & W. Bentley MacLeod, Beyond Master-Servant: A Critique of 
Vicarious Liability, in Exploring Tort Law 111,  115 (M. Stuart Madden ed., 2005). Of 
course, if third parties are aware of this potential extemality, they might be less willing to 
do business with the employer. Thus, there is a way in which the market could induce the 
employer either to hire only employees or only contractors who are demonstrably solvent 
or who have liability insurance. This is probably why, for example, building contractors 
often advertise that their workers are "fully insured" or "fully bonded;" that is, so that 
potential customers will not be dissuaded by the fear of suffering an unrecoverable harm. 
81 Arlen and MacLeod make a similar argument. Id. at 122. 
82 In the absence of such a requirement, judgment-proof parties will have an incentive to 
purchase only enough liability insurance necessary to cover their assets that are subject to 
liability. Shaven, note 32, at 193. 
83 See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4509.101 (LexisNexis 2010). 
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the liability to the employers but we allowed the obligation to be trans­
ferable, competition would induce the employers, through Coasean 
bargaining, to shift the burden contractually to employees. Employers 
would initially save money by shedding the liability, and employees 
would be willing to accept this liability, knowing that they were judg­
ment-proof. This general process might be thought of as a form of 
intentional or strategic judgment-proofing. It may be socially ineffi­
cient because shifting the liability (that is, the remittance obligation) 
increases the enforcement costs, by which we mean the social costs 
attendant to noncompliance. Such costs, which are borne directly by 
tax law enforcers, are not internalized by either the employer or the 
employee. 
How likely is this sort of intentional judgment-proofing in the real 
world? We are not aware of any systematic empirical studies of this 
question; however, the torts and the bankruptcy literatures both seem 
to assume that the problem is a real one. Some scholars have noted 
that there are substantial real-world incentives for parties intention­
ally to judgment-proof themselves in order to externalize the costs of 
potential tort harms onto third parties.84 For example, a number of 
scholars have noted the externality that arises when corporate defend­
ants become judgment-proof because of the doctrine of limited share­
holder liability, which provides that a corporate shareholder's liability 
for the debts of the corporation cannot exceed that shareholder's eq­
uity investment in the corporation.85 Moreover, some scholars have 
even observed that corporations have an incentive to strategically 
render themselves judgment-proof against large tort claims by shifting 
their most dangerous (or highest potential liability) activities into in­
adequately capitalized subsidiaries or brother-sister corporations.86 In 
addition, corporate tort defendants may adopt the strategy of borrow­
ing against their assets and giving the lenders security interests in 
84 See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Li­
ability for Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879, 1881 (1991). 
85 See, e.g., id. at 1881-83. 
86 See generally Lynn M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 Yale L.J. 1 (1996); Lynn 
M. LoPucki, The Essential Structure of Judgment-Proofing, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 147 (1998) 
[hereinafter Essential Structure]. LoPucki contends that corporations have a strong incen­
tive to (and in fact do) bifurcate their businesses into "operating entities," which will face 
potential tort liabilities, and "asset-owning entities," which will not-thereby effectively 
rendering the business judgment-proof. LoPucki, Essential Structure, supra, at 147. But 
see James J. White, Corporate Judgment-Proofing: A Response to Lynn LoPucki's The 
Death of Liability, 107 Yale L.J. 1363 (1998) (arguing that LoPucki overstates the problem 
of corporate judgment-proofing); Yair Listokin, Is Secured Debt Used to Redistribute 
Value from Tort Claimants in Bankruptcy? An Empirical Analysis, 57 Duke L.J. 1037 
(2008) (finding that firms with relatively large potential tort liabilities do not reveal a 
greater propensity to use secured debt, suggesting that the motive to "redistribute" from 
tort plaintiffs to secured creditors plays little role). 
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those assets, which secured interests come before tort claimants in pri­
ority in the event of bankruptcy, thus increasing the chances that the 
tort victims will go uncompensated. Potential solutions for this sort of 
intentional judgment-proofing include a range of policy proposals, in­
cluding: imposing liability on shareholders87 (or, as some have sug­
gested, on lenders as well88), giving tort claimants a higher priority in 
bankruptcy proceedings,89 requiring corporations to purchase liability 
insurance,90 or even increasing the use of direct ex ante regulation by 
government agencies. 
The more general point is that Coasean bargaining can lead to out­
comes that are privately joint-wealth maximizing but inefficient for 
society overall. This problem will arise, among other places, when 
parties are allowed to shift a tort liability to the party with respect to 
whom, for whatever reason (including judgment-proofness), enforcing 
the ex post liability would be most socially costly.91 As we discuss 
below, there is an analogous set of problems in the tax context. That 
is, although the conventional wisdom among economists is that the 
assignment of tax remittance responsibility is irrelevant to efficiency 
and distributive outcomes, we show that, once enforcement and com­
pliance costs are taken into account, those invariance conclusions may 
not obtain. We begin by presenting the conventional wisdom concern­
ing the tax invariance results mentioned in the introduction. 
D. From Torts to Tax 
Before proceeding further to the tax analogy, we need to emphasize 
the fundamental differences between the tort and tax liabilities. In 
the tort scenario that we have focused on, private actions undertaken 
in the context of contractual relationships inflict harm or the risk of 
harm on other private parties. (There are of course many other tort 
settings that do not involve contractual relationships, but they are less 
relevant to the tax comparison.) The efficiency motivations for impos­
ing tort liability in such a case are well known in the torts literature: 
to ensure that the right amount of the private activity is undertaken 
and also that the right amount of harm-reducing steps is taken (the 
activity-level and care-level effects mentioned above.) We might 
think of the costs incurred by parties to reduce the actual risks of 
87 E.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, note 84. 
88 E.g., David W. Leebron, Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors, 91 Colum. L. 
Rev. 1565, 1641 (1991). 
89 Id. at 1643. 
90 Hansmann & Kraakman, note 84, at 1927-28. 
91 Below we discuss what changes when it is not socially optimal to completely enforce 
the liability. See discussion in Section IV.D. 
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harm to others as tort "compliance costs," which are analogous to the 
costs incurred by taxpayers to comply with the tax laws. Once a tort 
liability regime is in place, however, private parties may also take 
steps (other than activity-level and care-level changes) to reduce their 
effective liability for a given harm. For example, they might attempt 
to judgment-proof themselves. Or they might even attempt to "cover 
up" their tort, by taking steps to make it difficult to trace the causal 
connection between the product and the harm.92 We might think of 
these costs as being akin to "evasion" on the tax side. Therefore, en­
forcing the tort liability itself generates costs-the costs of running the 
court system and establishing causation and liability-that we call 
"administrative costs." To distinguish these issues, we have intro­
duced the semantic distinction between the least-cost harm avoider 
(the party who can most efficiently reduce the harm or risk of harm by 
either care-level or activity-level changes, or both) and the least-cost 
liability avoider (the party who can most efficiently minimize the lia­
bility award, for a given amount of harm). 
Contrast the above-described tort situation with the case of a tax. 
First we need to distinguish two types of taxes: those designed to cor­
rect externalities (sometimes called Pigouvian taxes) and those de­
signed merely to raise revenue to spend on public goods. Pigouvian 
taxes are used much like tort law, to internalize externalities. Thus, if 
a given activity produces negative externalities, levying a tax on that 
activity equal to the marginal external social cost can be efficiency­
enhancing. Thus, the primary efficiency effect of a Pigouvian tax is 
the activity-level effect mentioned above, as the tax moves the amount 
of the externality-generating activity (down) toward its optimal level. 
A Pigouvian tax, in theory, can also have efficiency-enhancing care­
level effects, insofar as the tax can be adjusted ex post for the harm­
reducing steps that are undertaken. Such ex post adjustments to 
Pigouvian taxes, however, are rarely if ever actually made. The 
Pigouvian tax reduces the private utility of the parties involved in the 
market, but produces an offsetting social benefit to the extent the col­
lected revenue is spent on public goods. 
In the case of non-Pigouvian taxes, the tax is not imposed with the 
objective of reducing the level of the taxed activity.93 Indeed, any re­
duction in the amount of the taxed activity is an unintended, if una-
92 The tobacco industry did this for many years, producing their own research results 
that supposedly disproved or undermined the link between smoking and various illnesses. 
Wendy Koch & Kevin Johnson, Inside the Tobacco Wars Government Says Cover-Up 
Lasted 45 Years, USA Today, Sept. 23, 1999, at lA. 
93 A negative Pigouvian tax, or a Pigouvian subsidy, is designed to increase the level of 
the activity. In general, then, Pigouvian taxes/subsidies aim to change the level of some 
activity, pushing in the direction of optimality. 
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voidable, negative consequence of a non-Pigouvian tax.94 Thus, an 
optimal non-Pigouvian tax system seeks, other things equal, to mini­
mize the cost of these behavioral consequences, known as distortions. 
The only social benefit of such taxes arises from the uses to which the 
tax revenue is put. Because the revenue has social value, it is gener­
ally socially optimal for the government to expend resources to ensure 
that tax liability is remitted. In drawing out the analogy between tort 
and tax, we concentrate in what follows on non-Pigouvian taxes. 
IV. CoAsE MEETS THE TRIPs 
A. The Standard Tax Remittance Invariance Story: Zero 
Compliance and Administrative Costs 
We have argued that the Coase Theorem and the law-and-econom­
ics literature on torts, including Calabresi's notion of identifying the 
least-cost harm avoider, primarily address the problem of choosing 
the optimal legal responsibility for some expected harm. The problem 
to which we now turn, which is identical in some ways to the Coasean 
and Calabresian questions but different in others, is the problem of 
choosing the optimal assignment of the legal obligation to remit a 
given tax liability to the government. 
The standard view among economists is that the assignment of the 
tax remittance obligation has no effect on the incidence of the tax in 
question. This is the TRIPI notion, and something like it (though 
without the catchy acronym) can be found in every modern public 
finance text.95 The assumptions that underlie the TRIPI assertion typ­
ically are left implicit, but the basic story goes something like this: As 
above, it is standard to assume a competitive market setting-many 
small sellers and buyers, free entry and exit, no externalities, perfect 
information, long-run equilibrium price and quantity. The setting is 
often a tax triggered by sales of either commodities or labor. For sim­
plicity, we assume, as does the literature, that the taxes are assessed 
on a per-unit basis, although a very similar sort of analysis, with essen­
tially the same result, can be used for proportional taxes on value 
(that is, so-called ad valorem taxes). It is also implicitly assumed in 
these models that there are no administrative costs or compliance 
costs (such as the costs of learning the tax laws, gathering the relevant 
information, and filing the appropriate forms), or that the administra­
tive plus compliance costs are exactly the same among all remitters.96 
These are important assumptions that we relax below. 
94 Other than a lump sum tax. 
95 Rosen & Gayer, note 13, at 309-10. 
96 Id. 
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Given all of these assumptions, the results follow immediately: No 
matter who-seller or buyer-is assigned the legal responsibility for 
remitting the tax to the government, the results will be the same. The 
distributional consequences of the tax will depend not on the assign­
ment of the remittance obligation, but on the relative supply and de­
mand elasticities.97 This is exactly the same as in the Coasean 
externality case above. In addition, the degree of inefficiency or dead­
weight loss generated by the tax will depend not on the remittance 
responsibility but on the relevant elasticities: the less elastic the sup­
ply or demand for the good or service is, the smaller the deadweight 
loss.98 
We can illustrate our points with another stylized example, this one 
taken straight from the pages of any public finance text.99 Starting 
from Figure 2, which again represents the market for labor provided 
by workers and purchased by employers, we see again that there is an 
initial equilibrium price and quantity of labor sold and consumed. 
Next Figure 5 depicts what happens when we introduce a per-unit tax 
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quences of such a tax (and remittance obligation) can be shown by a 
parallel shift upward in the supply curve, just as in Figure 2. Although 
the remittance obligation is placed on workers (the suppliers of labor), 
the economic burden of the tax will be shared by the suppliers and 
consumers, through the changes in the prices they receive and pay, 
respectively; and the sharing of this burden between suppliers and 
consumers will depend on the relative supply and demand elasticities 
for labor. Thus, the analysis of the sharing of the tax burden is identi­
cal to the analysis of the sharing of the harm in Figure 2. The analysis 
of the overall social cost created by the introduction of a tax, however, 
is different from the Figure 2 analysis, for the simple reason that intro­
ducing a new tax (other than a Pigouvian tax) is different from intro­
ducing a new cost.100 
The difference is straightforward: When the tax, t, is introduced, it 
produces tax revenue, represented by the area IEGK, which, unlike 
the same area in Figure 2, is not a deadweight loss to society, but 
rather represents a transfer of purchasing power from private agents 
to the government. In a baseline case where the social value of the tax 
revenue per dollar is the same as the social value of a dollar of for­
gone private surplus, the social (or deadweight) loss is the difference 
between the decline in consumer and producer surplus, IEBGK, and 
the increase in tax revenue, IEGK; this difference is equal to the clas­
sic Harberger triangle representation of deadweight loss, the area 
EBG. This social cost arises because the tax imposes a "wedge" be­
tween the price paid by employers and the price received by workers, 
causing labor output to fall. The area EBG represents the social cost 
of the distortion of output from x0 to x1; the vertical distance between 
the S curve and the D curve represents the social cost of each margi­
nal unit of the forgone output, which is the difference between the 
value to the consumer and the value of the resources needed to pro­
duce it. 
And now for the tax invariance result. Figure 6 shows the effects of 
a unit tax of t on wages in the case where the employer must remit. 
As in the comparison between Figure 2 and 3, everything is exactly 
the same as between Figure 5 and 6: the wage paid by the employer 
and the wage received by the worker, the change in employer and 
worker surplus, the change in output, the tax revenue collected, and 
the deadweight loss. Thus, not only is the allocation of the burden 
between employers and workers invariant (which we have called 
100 We can imagine that the new cost assigned in Figures 2 and 3 are actually per-unit 
Pigouvian taxes designed to internalize some external cost that is created by the produc­
tion or use of widgets. The effect on prices and quantities would be the same, but the 
effect on social cost would have to reflect the social cost engendered by the externality. 
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TRIPI), but also there is exactly the same degree of inefficiency (or 
deadweight loss) produced by either remittance assignment (TRIPE). 
Again, this is the standard tax invariance explanation that is conven­
tional wisdom among tax economists.101 
B. Compliance Costs 
As was the case with the invariance conclusions above in our con­
tractual version of the Coase Theorem, a key implicit assumption of 
the standard demonstrations of these tax invariance propositions is 
that there are no administrative or compliance costs generated in the 
tax collection process, where administrative costs are again defined as 
those borne in the first instance by the government (but ultimately 
borne by individual taxpayers) and compliance costs are defined as 
those borne in the first instance by private parties (though these too 
may be shifted to parties other than those who remit the compliance 
costs). In the real world, of course, just as a tort system, or any other 
regulatory system, generates administrative and compliance costs, so 
too do tax systems. 
To expand our analysis to deal with these realities, we begin by as­
suming that taxpayers do indeed have to incur compliance costs to 
satisfy their tax obligations. They have to learn the relevant tax laws 
101 Slemrod addresses the situations under which TRIPI and TRIPE fail, without ad­
dressing the analogy to Coase, Calabresi, and torts. Slemrod, note 16. 
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and regulations, gather financial information that bears on their tax 
remittance obligations, file forms of various sorts, calculate the appro­
priate amount of tax and then remit it to the government; or they have 
to pay someone to do all those things for them. Moreover, we assume 
initially that, as between employers and employees, compliance costs 
are exactly the same. Specifically, we assume that whichever party is 
assigned the remittance burden will have to incur a per-unit compli­
ance cost of c, and the other nonremitting party will not have to incur 
any compliance costs. For simplicity, we assume that this compliance 
cost is a constant proportion of the amount of the good or service 
being produced in the transaction that triggers the tax. Thus, for 
every additional unit of labor sold and purchased in our example, the 
compliance cost goes up a proportional amount. These assumptions 
are entirely analogous to the assumptions in the previous Part discuss­
ing tort liability. We put administrative costs aside for now. Given all 
of these assumptions, Figure 7 shows how to analyze compliance costs, 
when the per-unit tax of t is remitted by the supplier, who also directly 
shoulders the per-unit compliance cost of c. 
The total deadweight loss to society is represented by the difference 
between the decline in consumer plus producer surplus, VUBNR, and 
the tax revenue collected, SMNR, which is equal to VUMS plus UBN. 
VUMS is the compliance cost and UBN is the social cost of distorting 
production/consumption from x0 to x2• 
Figure 8 shows that the effect would be no different if the remit­
tance obligation were placed on the employer, which, again, would 
produce the same per-unit level of compliance cost. 
The point is analogous to the point that we analyzed in the compari­
son between Figures 2 and 3: The remittance obligation (and thus the 
identity of the party who directly incurs the compliance costs) is in 
equilibrium immaterial to the impact of these costs on the welfare of 
both parties and the allocation of resources. 
Now we introduce the possibility of asymmetric compliance costs, 
where one class of parties (buyers or sellers, employers or employees) 
has lower compliance costs than the other. When might this be? 
Economies of scale to learning the tax laws, to gathering the relevant 
tax information, and to filing forms with the tax authorities, would 
suggest that bigger is better: Larger taxpayers would present lower 
compliance costs per unit of tax remitted and collected. For example, 
it seems likely that it would be cheaper to have the one employer 
(especially if it is a large employer) file the relevant forms and transfer 
the appropriate funds to the government rather than have dozens, 
hundreds, or thousands of employees do so separately. 
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The same argument could be made about the sales tax: We would 
expect, in general, that large retail sellers would be the least-cost re­
mitters of the tax on a given sale as compared with relatively small 
consumers. These conclusions are analogous to the assumptions 
sometimes made in tort law to justify respondeat superior liability of 
employers for employee torts: The employer can reduce the harm at a 
cost both less than the reduction in expected accident costs and less 
than the compliance cost of the employees. Recall that this was part 
of the argument for deep-pocket vicarious liability above.102 Now we 
make a similar, and to our minds equally plausible, argument in the 
context of tax remittance. How would this fit with our model? Does 
it alter the standard tax invariance results that are so commonly 
demonstrated in public finance textbooks? 
It depends. Are we in a Coasean world-with zero transaction 
costs and freely transferable entitlements and obligations-or are we 
not? If transaction costs between buyers and sellers (employers and 
employees) are zero, and if the parties are allowed to reallocate the 
remittance obligation between them as they see fit, the parties will 
shift the remittance obligation to the least-cost remitter (here the 
party with the lower compliance costs), and, ignoring administrative 
102 See discussion in Section 111.C. 
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and enforcement issues, social welfare will be maximized.103 If, how­
ever, transaction costs prevent such efficient shifting of remittance re­
sponsibility, then overall social welfare will be maximized only by 
imposing the remittance obligation on the least-cost remitter.104 Note 
also that, in terms of distribution, with either result (the efficient as­
signment of remittance responsibility to the least-cost remitter or the 
inefficient assignment to the other party) the distribution of utility be­
tween employers and employees will be determined by the relative 
elasticities of supply and demand. 
C. Asymmetric Administrative Costs: Judgment-Proof, Dishonest, 
or Otherwise Hard-to-Reach Taxpayers 
At this point we introduce the possibility that alternative tax remit­
tance obligations will produce asymmetric tax administrative costs as 
between buyers and sellers-in our continuing example, as between 
employers and employees. With respect to a tax on wages, for exam­
ple, if it could be shown that the costs to the government of adminis­
tering (that is, enforcing) an employer-based tax remittance obligation 
are lower than the cost of administering an employee-based remit-
103 An example is the remittance by the lender rather than homeowner for property 
taxes. This may be related to which party loses in the event of foreclosure. See Slemrod, 
note 16, at 255. 
104 See Craswell, note 18. 
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tance obligation, that would be an independent justification for plac­
ing the remittance responsibility on employers-independent of the 
compliance-cost argument.105 And the same could be said of a retail 
sales tax, assuming that the tax remittance obligations of sellers are 
cheaper to enforce than the tax remittance obligations of buyers. 
What might be the source of such differential administrative costs? 
In the torts context, we focused on insolvency or judgment-proofness 
as the source of differential administrative expense, because internal­
izing costs to a judgment-proof party may require costly ex ante regu­
lation or compulsory liability insurance. Judgment-proofness is 
relevant in the tax context as well, although it is somewhat less of a 
problem both because of the nature of tax liabilities (which arise more 
slowly and predictably than do tort liabilities) and because of the spe­
cial privileges typically afforded the tax collector in bankruptcy.106 
Still, some individual taxpayers, especially taxpayers who live from 
paycheck to paycheck, may have relatively few resources with which 
to pay a large tax judgment. Indeed, one justification commonly given 
for the current remittance regime for employment taxes in the United 
States is precisely this concern about judgment-proofness. As one 
well-known commentator put it, "Without a pay-as-you-earn system 
making the employer a 'deputy tax collector,' it would be difficult if 
not impossible to collect taxes from employees who spend their wages 
as fast as they are received."107 Likewise, corporate taxpayers are vul­
nerable to bankruptcy, which can leave them with little money with 
which to pay their tax liabilities. In any event, if the tax remittance 
obligation is assigned to a party who ends up being insolvent, the tax 
is obviously less likely to be collected than otherwise absent the expen­
diture of additional administrative resources. 
The possibility of an insolvent tax remitter is not the only potential 
source of asymmetric administrative costs. It could also be argued 
that it is inherently cheaper (per dollar of revenue raised) for the tax 
authority to police large taxpayers, because of the economics of scale 
in tax enforcement. It is cheaper, for example, for the government to 
audit a single large employer than to audit all of the employers' em­
ployees separately. In addition, corporate taxpayers may have more 
105 For now we continue to assume that the government expends whatever resources are 
necessary to collect the entire legal tax obligation. 
I06 For example, with U.S. federal taxes (income, gift, or estate), the U.S. government 
automatically receives a lien against all the assets of a taxpayer if the taxpayer does not pay 
the taxes upon "demand." IRC § 6321. Such tax liens automatically take priority over the 
taxpayer's own claim to the property and, shortly thereafter, over all other creditors other 
than secured creditors whose interests were perfected earlier. 11 U.S.C. §§ 506-507. 
107 Boris I. Bittker & Lawrence Lokken, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates & Gifts 
'11 111 .5.2 (2005) (quoting McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. United States, 623 F.2d 700 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). 
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financially at stake in their reputations and may therefore be less will­
ing to risk being found guilty of tax evasion.108 If that is true, the per­
dollar cost of administering an income tax system in which the remit­
tance obligation is placed on large employers would be lower than the 
per-dollar cost of a system that placed the obligation on employees. 
The same argument could be made with respect to sales taxes. That is, 
imposing the sales tax remittance obligation on large retail sellers to 
remit is almost certainly less costly administratively than asking each 
retail purchaser to remit the tax. We acknowledge, of course, that 
large corporations also have agency problems; and sometimes corpo­
rate management may be more willing to engage in tax fraud than 
even the corporations' shareholders would prefer. On the other hand, 
the more employees that are involved, the more difficult it is to main­
tain a pattern of outright tax evasion, as the possibility of detection 
rises with the number of potential whistleblowers. 
What these arguments suggest is that, in situations in which the poli­
cymaker is choosing who between two contractually connected parties 
should bear the tax remittance responsibility for the tax triggered by 
the parties' interaction, the best way to achieve the policymaker's in­
tended combination of tax revenue and distributive burdens (at lowest 
cost) is to impose the remittance obligation on the larger, wealthier 
party-the one most likely to have assets with which to pay the tax 
and the one whose tax compliance will be cheapest (per dollar of tax 
collected) to ensure (that is, the one who, if given the remittance obli­
gation, will give rise to the lowest administrative costs of tax enforce­
ment). Notice that this administrative cost argument cuts in the same 
direction as the least-cost remitter argument, which also points in the 
direction of giving the remittance obligation to the larger, wealthier 
party-the one who could benefit from economies of scale with re­
spect to tax compliance costs. This convergence is similar to the con­
vergence of arguments, discussed above, in favor of vicarious tort 
liability, as both least-cost harm avoider and administrative/enforce­
ment cost arguments favored respondeat superior liability under cer­
tain assumptions. In sum, just as deep-pocket tort liability can be 
justified in the tort context on efficiency grounds, it can also be justi­
fied in the tax context on similar grounds. 
Of course, size is not everything. There may be situations in which, 
irrespective of the relative size or wealth of the parties to a given 
transaction, one or the other is more likely to be beyond the reach of 
the tax authority (which we can think of as giving rise to very high 
administrative costs). This will be a problem when one of the parties 
ms See Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 Nat'!. Tax J. 877 
(2004). 
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is either outside of the taxing jurisdiction or is readily able to leave the 
jurisdiction. For example, imagine a taxable transaction in which the 
payer is within the taxing jurisdiction and the payee is outside the tax­
ing jurisdiction. If the tax authority does not require the payer to 
withhold and remit tax on the payment, there may be no other oppor­
tunity to collect the tax, as the payee will be effectively judgment­
proof-even if the payee has more overall assets than the payer. This 
issue can obviously arise in the international context, where payments 
are made by U.S. taxpayers to foreign individuals or entities, or in the 
domestic U.S. context, where state taxing authorities are trying to col­
lect taxes on interstate transactions. Some might argue that in such a 
situation the best (or fairest) approach would be to find a way to have 
the payee remit the tax. Our point is that, even if that were possible 
(and we are assuming for the moment that it is), the incidence would 
be the same whether the payer or payee remits, and the administrative 
cost of enforcing a domestic payer remittance obligation will likely be 
much lower. 
We should also note another analogy between the tax and tort re­
mittance questions. In the tort context, we noted that it will not al­
ways be socially efficient to allow the parties to transfer the 
remittance obligation contractually between them; recall the discus­
sion of strategic judgment-proofing.109 A similar argument would ap­
ply in the tax context. Once we allow for such differential 
administrative costs, whether because of the economies of scale, the 
judgment-proof problem, the foreign or missing taxpayer problem, or 
because of differences in inherent willingness to evade taxes, then al­
lowing the remittance responsibility to be transferable does not auto­
matically lead to the socially efficient outcome because a transfer of 
remittance responsibility may reduce the sum of compliance costs but 
increase administrative costs by more than the compliance cost sav­
ings. In terms of the figures, an important difference between the 
analysis of Figure 4 and that of Figure 7 arises if the identity of the tax 
remitter affects the administrative cost of the tax collected. In this 
case the social cost of ILMS plus LBN shown in Figure 7 misses one 
component of the social cost. It is possible that moving to the low­
cost remitter, where cost is measured in terms of compliance costs and 
distortion alone, might not represent the minimum social-cost remit­
ter, if the former facilitates tax evasion or, in other words, makes tax 
enforcement more costly. The overall efficient tax remittance ar­
rangement should minimize the sum of three cost elements: distortion 
cost, compliance cost, and administrative cost. 
109 See discussion in Section 111.C. 
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D. Optimal Evasion and Taxpayer Heterogeneity 
So far we have implicitly (and sometimes explicitly) assumed that 
compliance costs and, in particular, administrative costs may have to 
be incurred to achieve compliance with the tax laws, but that, once 
these costs are incurred, complete compliance is achieved. In that 
context, we noted that the TRIPs do not hold, so long as there are 
asymmetric compliance or administrative costs as between the parties 
to the transaction that triggers the tax. What changes in our analysis if 
we recognize the fact that, despite optimal investments to ensure com­
pliance, there will nevertheless be some successful evasion? Put dif­
ferently, how does the analysis change if full compliance with the tax 
law is not a certainty? This may be because it is impossible to achieve 
full compliance. Or it may be because it is not worth the cost; that is, 
because of the nature of the social welfare function, there may-in­
deed, will almost certainly be-a point at which the cost of achieving 
marginally improved compliance exceeds the marginal benefit. In 
such a case, what is the effect on TRIPs? What does it mean for the 
optimal allocation of tax remittance responsibility? 
As we argue in this Section, the tax invariance propositions still do 
not hold. What is more, to the extent residual noncompliance is dis­
tributed heterogeneously across the population of taxed parties, it 
turns out that (ignoring how the tax dollars are spent) the introduction 
of a non-Pigouvian tax may actually improve the welfare of the 
noncompliant parties while decreasing the welfare of the compliant 
parties. A similar point can be made with respect to heterogeneous 
tort compliance. 
Before we get to that result, though, notice that if tax compliance is 
uncertain, the effect of a tax on equilibrium prices will depend on the 
expectations each side-buyer and seller-has about their eventual 
tax liability and on any attendant cost associated with (successful or 
unsuccessful) noncompliance. In the standard model of optimal eva­
sion, individuals will evade as long as the reduction in their expected 
tax and penalty remittances exceeds the marginal private cost of the 
evasion, where private cost includes the costs to the tax remitters of 
disguising their behavior to the tax collector as well as the cost of re­
mitters' increased risk-bearing owing to the uncertainty in after-tax 
income that the evasion creates. Because (it is assumed that) the mar­
ginal private costs are increasing with additional investments in eva­
sion, whereas the marginal private gain is not, eventually the marginal 
private gain from evasion will fall short of the marginal private cost. 
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Because of the costs incurred, the net private gain will be less than the 
expected tax saving. no 
Governments have access to a number of policy actions that can 
reduce evasion, but it generally is not socially optimal to eliminate 
evasion completely, just as it is not optimal to expend the resources 
necessary to eliminate all torts or to expunge all robbery. This is true 
even when one enforcement tool is the financial penalty for detected 
evasion, which is not a social cost, because very high penalties may 
have consequences that are socially costly. This conclusion has impor­
tant consequences for our analysis. To see this, imagine that the re­
mittance responsibility for a given tax is switched from one party from 
whom collection would be inexpensive (in terms of compliance and 
administrative costs), so inexpensive such that full compliance is so­
cially optimal, to another from whom collection would be expensive. 
The optimal policy response in general would not be to maintain full 
compliance and incur the now-considerable administrative costs of so 
doing. Rather the optimal policy responses would be a combination 
of somewhat higher administrative expenditure plus allowing a lower 
level of compliance. This lower level of compliance entails social 
costs, including higher risk-bearing costs and perhaps the need to raise 
somewhat (not necessarily equal) more revenue in some other (costly) 
way. Thus, once the idea of socially optimal evasion is recognized, the 
increase in administrative costs does not accurately measure the in­
crease in social costs from moving to an inferior remittance regime. 
Now recognize that the inclination and opportunity to evade suc­
cessfully is heterogeneous-not only as between buyers and sellers (as 
we have already discussed) but within the class of buyers and within 
the class of sellers.111 From an ex ante perspective, people (including 
those people who make decisions for firms) differ both in their intrin­
sic honesty and in their available opportunities for evasion.112 From 
an ex post perspective, some acts of evasion are detected by enforce­
ment systems, while others are not; of those acts that are detected, the 
no Because of the penalty revenues collected on detected evasion, the private cost ex­
ceeds the social cost. 
111 Medema and Zerbe make a separate observation about the impact of heterogeneity: 
that when people have heterogeneous utility functions, the assignment of property rights 
can affect allocation because it changes aggregate demand functions. and therefore equilib­
rium production. Medema & Zerbe, note 2, at 846-47. For example, if the injurers have a 
higher wealth elasticity of demand for chili peppers than the injured. assigning the property 
rights to the injurers will increase the aggregate demand for chili peppers, and therefore 
their price, unless all goods are produced at constant cost (and therefore equilibrium prices 
are always unaffected by demand conditions). 
112 To the extent that heterogeneous evasion opportunities apply to categories of em­
ployer and employee, there will be market adjustments in the remuneration of that activ­
ity; the following examples therefore apply to heterogeneity not associated with such 
categories. See the example of housepainters below. 
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U Tax Law Review 
842 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: 
penalties may differ. Although it is the aggregate response to a tax 
rate change that will determine how much a given tax rate change 
affects the consumer and producer prices, respectively, the effect on 
any one person or firm will depend on the price change and on their 
own exposure to the price, which now depends on their evasion be­
havior-which again turns on their ex ante characteristics and their ex 
post results-as well as their (other) preferences and technology. 
To see the implications for the TRIPs of these more realistic as­
sumptions, consider a tax on the income from house painting. As­
sume that the remittance obligation is placed on the painter rather 
than the paintee and that half of housepainters are scrupulously hon­
est while the other half are scrupulously dishonest. Assume further 
that there is no private cost incurred to effect the evasion, that the 
probability of detection is zero, and, of course, that all parties are fully 
informed of all of these facts. What happens when the tax is intro­
duced? The supply curve shifts up by only one-half of the tax rate, 
since only the one-half of the painters actually will remit the taxes 
they owe will require a higher pretax payment to elicit the same work. 
The impact on equilibrium prices as always depends on the relative 
supply and demand elasticities, here for house painting services. For 
the sake of simplicity, say that the supply and demand elasticities are 
equal (and not affected by the evasion possibilities).113 In this case 
the price to consumers rises by exactly one-forth of the tax: one-half 
of the one-half-of-the-tax upward shift in the supply curve. As long as 
the price received by noncompliant painters is the same as the price 
paid by consumer (that is, there is no tax wedge), the price they each 
receive goes up by this same amount. As a result, the noncompliant 
painters are better off because of this tax. In contrast, the price re­
ceived by honest housepainters falls by three-quarters of the tax (that 
is, the full tax remitted offset by a price increase of one-forth of the 
tax). An identical result could be reached if the heterogeneity was not 
with respect to inherent honesty, but judgment-proofness; for exam­
ple, if we assumed that half were judgment-proof, half were not, and 
detection was a certainty. 
Consider now a slightly different example involving a more general 
labor income tax. Specifically, imagine a labor income tax that is to be 
remitted by employers, and assume that the pre- and post-tax wages 
have adjusted to reflect this tax. With one exception: One small firm 
does not remit the tax, and it costlessly and completely gets away with 
it. (The firm's employees do not suspect, and are unaware of, the eva­
sion). In this situation, the owners of the lone noncompliant firm are 
better off because in the new equilibrium they incur the lower after-
113 See discussion in Section IV.E. 
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tax wage rather than the pretax wage incurred by all other firms­
Indeed, they are better off because of the imposition of the tax. This 
occurs because the market adjustment in wages depends on the re­
sponses of the preponderance of tax-complying firms, not on the be­
havior of the relatively few (or single, in this example) noncompliant 
firms. That is, as long as the noncompliant firms remain only a small 
part of the market, they benefit from the decline in the after-tax wage 
expected by their (assumed to be homogeneous) workers, but they do 
not remit the tax that is the cause of that decline. We might say, then, 
that this result follows from the heterogeneity of firms with respect to 
their inclination and ability to evade taxes. If, alternatively, the remit­
tance obligation were placed on employees instead of employers, then 
the employer heterogeneity would not matter, and what would matter 
is the heterogeneity of employees. Which side is given the obligation 
to remit will not affect the relative burden on average as between em­
ployers and employees, but will affect which particular parties (indi­
viduals and firms) win and lose, and by how much. Thus, TRIPI is 
violated in circumstances in which there is heterogeneity among tax­
payers with respect to their willingness or ability to evade. 
A similar analysis can be applied in the tort context. The best anal­
ogy would be the one discussed above involving parties who intention­
ally judgment-proof themselves against potential tort liabilities.114 A 
firm or individual who knowingly engages in some activity that poses a 
risk of third-party harm that exceeds the injurer's ability to reimburse 
can be understood as a sort of tort liability evader. And the willing­
ness and ability to engage in that sort of behavior is almost certainly 
heterogeneously distributed across parties, even within industries. As 
a result of this fact, of course, the naive Coasean prediction that the 
assignment of liability should have no distributional consequences 
does not hold. Moreover, this argument lends credence to the familiar 
observation that the introduction of any tax or legal restriction actu­
ally increases the utility of the noncompliant parties (vis a vis the 
world without the tax or restriction), so long as there are enough com­
pliant parties to cause an increase in the pretax price of the activity. 
E. Nonproportional Collection Costs 
To this point we assumed that aggregate compliance costs are pro­
portional to the aggregate quantity produced/consumed (that is, they 
are a fixed per-unit constant), although we allowed the costs at any 
aggregate output level to depend on what the remittance arrange­
ments are. We hinted though at the likelihood that the magnitude and 
114 See text accompanying notes 83-91. 
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nature of these costs may depend on the micro details of the markets 
involved. In this Section we pursue the implications of looking at the 
micro-foundations of enforcement and compliance costs. 
To fix ideas, consider a stylized world in which remittance-related 
compliance costs are completely inframarginal, in the sense that the 
per-period cost is unaffected by the extent of a participant's involve­
ment (that is, how much they buy, or sell) in a taxed activity, but only 
by the fact of participating in the market. In other words, there are 
fixed, but no variable, costs of compliance. Let the remittance burden 
be on firms. Some, presumably mostly small, firms will no longer be 
profitable, and will drop out of the market. This means that the sup­
ply curve shifts upward, and the new equilibrium price will be higher 
depending on the relative supply and demand elasticities. But the 
higher price is of greater value to bigger firms than to smaller firms 
(because they sell more), so that the new equilibrium will have impli­
cations for the distribution of firm sizes. Moreover, as above, these 
consequences would differ if the remittance responsibility was placed 
on consumers. In the latter case firm heterogeneity would be immate­
rial, and consumer heterogeneity would affect the outcome. 
Consider the consequences if the remittance responsibility was 
placed on consumers, with a compliance cost triggered by participat­
ing in the market but unrelated to the extent of participation. Some 
consumers, presumably small ones, would be dissuaded from entering 
the market, and so the demand curve would shift down. This would 
cause a decline in the market price, depending on the relative supply 
and demand elasticities, but the decline would not offset the utility 
loss equally for small and large consumers; small consumers would be 
relatively worse off, because the price decline is of relatively little im­
portance compared to the fixed compliance cost. 
When there is evasion, having the remittance responsibility can also 
change the elasticity of response. For example, consider the conse­
quences if the private cost of an employee evading a given amount of 
labor income is lower when the true amount of labor income is 
higher.115 This implies that the elasticity of labor supply with respect 
to the pretax wage rate will be different from its elasticity with respect 
to the tax rate. It also reduces the effective marginal tax rate on sup­
plying labor, because of the "evasion-facilitating" character of labor 
supply, and in general will alter both the height of the labor supply 
curve and its elasticity. To the extent it affects the elasticity of labor 
supply, the incidence of imposing any cost, including a compliance 
cost, will change. If the elasticity of labor supply is larger (smaller) 
115 Joel Slemrod, A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation, 8 Int'! Tax 
& Pub. Fin. 119, 120-22 (2001). 
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than otherwise, then any cost will shift away from (toward) labor 
more than it otherwise would. If alternatively the employer had to 
remit and had evasion possibilities, then it is labor demand that is po­
tentially affected, with different consequences for the incidence of tax 
liability or compliance cost. Only if the pretax wage elasticity and tax 
rate elasticity of labor supply bear a particular symmetric relationship 
with the pretax wage and tax rate elasticity of labor supply will the 
remittance responsibility be irrelevant for the pretax and after-tax 
wage rate. 
F. Equivalences 
A transitivity property applies to the tax remittance invariance prin­
ciples, TRIPI and TRIPE: If tax system A has identical consequences 
as tax system B, and tax system B has identical consequences as tax 
system C, then tax system A has identical consequences as tax system 
C. Stringing together a series of transitivity relationships reveals 
some well-known equivalences among tax systems with very different 
remittance arrangements, where equivalence means identical inci­
dence, allocation, and efficiency consequences. Consider the retail 
sales tax. We already discussed that the tax triggered by retail sales 
could, in principle, be remitted by the concumers or by the retail es­
tablishments. In the latter case, which is the norm for all retail sales 
taxes for reasons already discussed, there must be a mechanism to dis­
tinguish business sales made to other businesses from business sales to 
consumers; in U.S. states' retail sales taxes this is done by issuing busi­
ness exemption certificates to business purchasers.116 
Now recognize that, in the absence of enforcement concerns, the 
combination of a tax that must be remitted by one party to a transac­
tion and an equal credit offered to the other party is equivalent to 
levying no net tax at all. Next observe that a value-added tax (VAT) is 
equivalent to a tax triggered by retail sales plus offsetting taxes and 
credits triggered by every business-to-business sale. Because each of 
these offsetting tax-and-credit remittance obligations net to zero, the 
VAT thus is-absent enforcement concerns-equivalent to a retail 
sales tax, as all tax textbooks note.111 
116 Abuse of such exemption certificates is a major enforcement concern. 
117 See, e.g., Rosen & Gayer, note 13, at 486. To see this, imagine a highly stylized 
economy consisting of two firms. 
Example I: Firm A uses $30 of labor to produce its product, which it sells for 
$40 to Firm B, making a $10 profit. Firm B uses Firm A's output as an input, 
and hires $45 of labor to produce a product that it sells to consumers for $100, 
making a $15 profit. A 10% retail sales tax would collect $10 from Firm B. 
Under a VAT, the tax base is receipts minus purchases from other businesses. 
Thus, a 10% VAT would collect $4 from Firm A and $6 from Firm B, for a 
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What is the advantage of adding remittance obligations (and credit 
entitlements) for nonretail businesses to a retail sales tax, as a VAT 
does, and thereby in principle involving all businesses in the tax sys­
tem? The answer lies in the administrative and enforcement implica­
tions. Because of the difficulty of involving the multitude of 
consumers in the tax system, a retail sales tax has no natural way to 
check that the retailer has remitted the correct amount. But business­
to-business sales allow for the possibility of such a check, in that the 
credit of the purchasing business is contingent on an invoice provided 
by the seller attesting to its remittance. Moreover, under a VAT the 
identity of the purchaser (that is, whether it is a final consumer or a 
business) is no longer relevant, so business exemption certificates (and 
the evasion they induce and the enforcement they require) are not 
needed. Thus, applying the framework of this Article, we might say 
that, although the VAT and the retail sales tax are equivalent assum­
ing equal administrative costs, once we acknowledge the relatively 
high administrative costs that would be necessary to achieve 
equivalent levels of compliance under the retail sales tax, the VAT is 
overall superior. ns 
total of $10. Starting from a retail sales tax, adding the business-to-business 
transactions to the tax base adds $4 of tax liability on Firm A and a $4 credit 
for Firm B, and thus an additional net tax liability of zero. 
us The VAT, of course, has its own weaknesses in terms of enforceability. In recent 
years a new VAT tax evasion scam, called "missing trader fraud" or "carousel fraud," has 
spread across much of the VAT-using world, especially among EU countries, where goods 
can be sold between countries without triggering any net tax. In its simplest form, the 
scheme works this way: One party imports some good from another VAT country, free of 
tax because of the zero rating of exports. Then the importer turns around and sells the 
good to a domestic purchaser, charging a price that is somewhat higher than otherwise 
because of the VAT that is owed on the purchase (that is, because most sales do result in 
the VAT being paid). The seller then disappears without actually remitting the tax on the 
sale. The domestic buyer, innocent and unaware of the fraud, may then file for a credit for 
the tax that should have been remitted by the buyer, only to learn that the taxing authority 
may be unwilling to give the credit for the tax that was not in fact remitted. See generally 
Richard Pincher, The Cost of VAT Frauds: Bond House Systems Ltd and Optigen, 5 Brit. 
Tax Rev. 346 (2003). The carousel concept arises when this arrangement is repeated, with 
several parties buying and selling the same product, with (again) some (though not all) of 
the parties involved simply disappearing without remitting any tax. The EU Tax Bar and 
tax enforcers regard the carousel fraud problem as a serious threat to the viability of the 
VAT as a reliable source of revenue, and some have even argued for experimenting with 
the retail sales tax alternative. See Michael Keen & Stephen Smith, VAT Fraud and Eva­
sion: What Do We Know and What Can Be Done?, 59 Nat'! Tax J. 861 (2006). What this 
example makes clear is that identifying the lowest-overall-cost tax remitter (taking into 
account administrative costs) is not always an easy task, may defy our easy intuitions, and 
may even be a moving target. It also suggests the possibility of an expanded role for joint­
and-several tax liability. In the carousel fraud example discussed above, this would mean 
holding the innocent buyer liable secondarily for the tax by disallowing their credit if the 
tax is not remitted by the buyer in the first instance. At least one court has decided, how­
ever, that this result is inappropriate and that innocent third parties who are caught up in 
the offending transaction should not be made to remit the tax. Joined Cases C-354/03, C-
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A VAT is turned into the Hall-Rabushka flat tax by adding one 
more set of exactly offsetting tax obligations and credit entitlements­
between firms and employees.119 Under the flat tax (but not under a 
VAT), firms can deduct payments to workers (that is, credit taxes) and 
the workers "owe" tax on their wages and salaries. If the business tax 
and labor income tax rate are equal, this is equivalent to levying no 
tax at all. In contrast to the switch from a retail sales tax to a VAT 
under the usual remittance arrangements for each, though, the switch 
from a VAT to a Hall-Rabushka flat tax need not entail any change in 
remittance responsibility because firms could withhold and remit tax 
to fulfill their workers' labor income tax obligations; thus the pattern 
of remittances could be identical to a VAT. The motivation for intro­
ducing these zero-net-tax obligations is that, by levying a tax on labor 
income and requiring individuals to complete returns, the tax obliga­
tion can be tailored to the individual worker's situation. In particular, 
each worker can be allocated a fixed exemption of labor income.120 
Thus, the motivation of moving from a VAT to a Hall-Rabushka flat 
tax is to allow flexibility in implementing progressivity and not, as in 
the case of moving from a retail sales tax to a VAT, to improve admin­
istration and enforcement. 
Introducing zero-net-tax remittance obligations and credit entitle­
ments for administration and enforcement reasons is the same motiva­
tion behind reverse withholding requirements.121 These obligations 
and entitlements need not be triggered by exactly the same transac­
tions as the underlying tax base; for example, in a VAT the value of 
any single business-to-business sale, which triggers tax remittance ob-
355/03 & C-484/03, Optigen Ltd., Fulcrum Electronics Ltd. and Bond House Systems Ltd. 
v. Comm'rs of Customs & Excise (2006), available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62003J0354:EN:HTML. Our framework, however, would sug­
gest that requiring the innocent third parties to remit the tax might come closer to approxi­
mating the lawmakers' desired combination of efficiency and distributive outcomes. The 
argument is comparable to the argument for expanding the wage withholding rules to 
cover payments to independent contractors. 
119 The flat tax proposal is laid out in Robert E. Hall & Alvin Rabushka, The Flat Tax 
(1995). Under the tax, there is a business tax base and a personal tax base. The business 
tax base is receipts minus payments to labor and purchases from other firms. Id. at 60-64. 
The personal tax base is receipts of labor income. Id. at 58-60. Under the original Hall­
Rabushka proposal, both bases are subject to an identical flat rate, and there is an exemp­
tion for personal income that depends on marital status. 
Example 2: In Example 1, under a 10% flat tax with no exemption, Firm A 
would have a tax liability of $1, Firm B would have a tax liability of $1.50, and 
there would be labor income tax due of $7.50 (that could be remitted by the 
firms on behalf of the employees), for a total of $10. 
120 In the X-tax championed by David Bradford, a graduated rate structure is applied to 
labor income. David F. Bradford, What Are Consumption Taxes and Who Pays Them?, 39 
Tax Notes 383, 383 (Apr. 18, 1988). 
121 See discussion in Section V.D. 
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ligations and credit entitlements, is not consumption. Indeed, any tax 
system is defined by the totality of its remittance obligations (and 
credit entitlements), any one of which need not be based on a well­
known tax base such as aggregate consumption or production. For 
example, a tax on aggregate consumption can be implemented by lev­
ying tax on each act of consumption, or on each firm's value added, 
knowing that (ignoring foreign trade) aggregate value added equals 
aggregate consumption. 
Now consider again the tort context. Imagine some harm arises out 
of the production or consumption of a good or service. We have al­
ready argued that, absent administrative and enforcement concerns, 
the tort liability could be placed on the producing firms or the con­
sumers with equivalent consequences. We now see that tort liability in 
principle could be placed on any party doing business with either the 
producing firms or the consumers (or, in the employment context, any 
party doing business with either the employers or the employees) and, 
furthermore, that the base of any particular liability need not be the 
same as the harm-producing action. Pursuing the analogy with the 
VAT, if final consumption produces harm, the tort "remittance" liabil­
ity could be placed not only on the retail business and consumer, but 
also on businesses throughout the production and distribution chain 
that precedes the retail transaction. 
For example, just as a VAT can produce the equivalent level of tax 
revenue and distributional consequences as a retail sales tax, though 
at lower administrative costs, so too imposing tort liability on the par­
ties who are in the lower stages of the chain of production of some 
product (that ultimately causes a third-party harm) can achieve 
equivalent consequences to imposing the harm on the final seller­
and may do so at relatively low administrative costs. This is indeed 
one of the efficiency arguments for making strict products liability 
joint-and-several with respect to retail sellers, wholesalers, and manu­
facturers, including manufacturers of component parts. 
G. Qualifications 
Our results depend on an assumption that all market participants 
make decisions on the basis of tax-inclusive prices and are not affected 
by the situational framing of the prices or by any other behavioral 
phenomena, such as the endowment effect, that would introduce other 
considerations into their decisions. If, for example, a worker per­
ceives the same after-tax take-home pay of $600 per week differently 
depending on whether the check comes after-tax or whether it comes 
pretax and she must remit the tax, this could affect the amount of 
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labor supplied at a given after-tax wage and our conclusions would 
have to be modified. 
Such behavioral phenomena could also have political economy im­
plications, to the extent they affect taxpayer-voters' perception of the 
cost of government programs. There is some evidence that tax sys­
tems are designed to minimize the perceived burden of a given 
amount of tax liability.122 The politics of income tax withholding in 
the United States suggest that remittance matters, as many conserva­
tives dislike withholding because it reduces the visibility of tax collec­
tion and thus reduces the perceived cost of government. They prefer 
that employees, not employers, remit taxes every week or every 
month. Indeed, some legislators introduced into Congress a bill enti­
tled the Cost of Government Awareness Act of 2001, which would 
eliminate withholding and instead require individuals to remit income 
taxes in monthly installments.123 Likewise, the version of the Hall­
Rabushka flat tax introduced as a bill by then-House Majority Leader 
Dick Armey eliminated employer withholding, which Armey referred 
to as a "deceptive device that has made big government possible."124 
The remittance rules may also matter in the transition from one tax 
system to another. As an example, consider the consequences of abol­
ishing a retail sales tax. If tax-inclusive prices were fixed in the short 
run, eliminating the retailers' requirement to remit would provide a 
windfall gain to their owners. If, alternatively, consumers had been 
the remitting party, they would gain if the tax-inclusive price stayed 
fixed. The transition gains and losses thus depend critically on the 
short-run flexibility of prices. 
V. APPLYING THE LEAST-COST-REMITTER IDEA 
A. Current Law: Tax Withholding, Sales Tax Remittance, and 
Gift Tax Liability 
Our analysis provides an explanation for a number of aspects of 
current tax law in the United States and other countries and suggests 
some possible reforms. First, consider wage withholding for individ­
ual income taxes. From the perspective of our framework, imposing 
an obligation on the employer to withhold and remit taxes that are 
based on the overall income status of its employees is akin to vicarious 
employer tax liability. That is, except for the inherent distinctions al-
122 See Aradhna Krishna & Joel Slemrod, Behavioral Public Finance: Tax Design as 
Price Presentation, 10 lnt'l Tax & Pub. Fin. 189 (2003). 
123 Cost of Government Awareness Act of 2001, H.R. 1364, 107th Cong. 
124 Dick Armey, Why America Needs the Flat Tax, in Fairness and Efficiency in the Flat 
Tax 96, 99 (1996) ("Only by taking people's money before they ever see it has the govern­
ment been able to raise taxes to their current height without sparking a revolt."). 
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ready discussed between taxes and torts, wage withholding is similar 
in important ways to vicarious employer liability for the harms caused 
by employees. This analogy not only suggests a rationale for the cur­
rent income tax withholding rules, but also provides an argument for a 
reasonable expansion of those rules-along the lines of expanded em­
ployer tort liability discussed above. 
But first let us review the U.S. wage withholding rules in greater 
detail. Under the U.S. tax system, both the employers and the em­
ployees have remittance obligations with respect to the taxes owed on, 
or triggered by, an employee's income. The Code, for example, im­
poses on employers an obligation to "deduct and withhold" a given 
percentage of the employee's wages as employment taxes, to hold 
these funds in trust for Treasury (typically in a special account in a 
bank that is qualified to accept tax remittances), and then eventually 
to remit those funds to the government.125 Employment taxes include 
Social Security and Medicare taxes, federal unemployment taxes, and 
federal income taxes. With respect to the Social Security, Medicare, 
and unemployment taxes, the amounts to be withheld are strictly pre­
scribed by law.126 With respect to income tax withholding, although 
the employee has some say as to the amount that is withheld (through 
the filing of his Form W-4), the rules generally encourage withholding 
that approximates an individual employee's overall income tax liabil­
ity. If the employee wants to withhold more than the minimal 
amount, she can do that as well, as many wage-earners do, and then 
file for a refund. 
Once the employer withholds and subsequently remits the portion 
of the income tax liability for which it is responsible, the employee 
also has a separate legal responsibility to remit any income tax she 
owes in excess of the amount remitted on her behalf by her em­
ployer.127 That is, if the employer(s) withholds less than the full 
amount of income tax that the employee owes, the employee must 
then file a tax return by the filing deadline with a check for the differ­
ence. This is obviously what many individual taxpayers do every year 
when they send a check in with their 1040s. Of course, if an employer 
withholds and remits more in tax than is owed with respect to the 
125 IRC § 3402(a). 
126 IRC §§ 3101, 3301. In common parlance Social Security, Medicare, and unemploy­
ment taxes are typically described as being split equally between the employer and the 
employee-with the employer owing half of the tax and the employee owing the other half. 
An employer is required to remit both amounts, with the employee's portion being consid­
ered an amount deducted and withheld from the employee's wage. As long as the remit­
tance burden for both amounts is placed on the employer, the two portions of these taxes 
have identical efficiency and distributional effects. 
121 IRC §§ 1, 31(a)(l), 61, 62 (providing that an individual credits taxes withheld against 
their tax liability). 
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employee's income, the government refunds the excess to the em­
ployee. Thus both the employer and employee have a remittance re­
sponsibility with respect to the income tax triggered by an individual 
employee's income.12s 
Note that under current U.S. tax law, if the employer fails to with­
hold and remit the amount required by law from the employee's 
wages, the government can seek payment for that amount not only 
from the employer but also from the employee. Thus, as to the em­
ployer's remittance obligation, if the employer fails to withhold and 
pays the employee the pretax wage, the employer is the primary obli­
gor and the employee is the secondary obligor. Thus, if the employer 
does not deduct and withhold the amount from the employee's pretax 
wages, that amount is not credited to the employee for purposes of 
her year-end remittance obligation.129 In such a situation, however, if 
the Service ultimately recovers the tax from the employer for the un­
withheld taxes, the employer may then seek recovery of that amount 
from the employee.130 The basis for the employer's claim against the 
employee would be contractual rather than statutory. That is, the em­
ployer implicitly agrees to pay the employee the post-withholding 
amount; therefore, if the employer fails to deduct and withhold, it has 
in effect overpaid the employee by the unwithheld amount and can, 
contractually, seek recovery for that amount--though perhaps unen­
forceable if the employee proves to be judgment-proof. This rule is 
akin to joint-and-several liability, in that the government can go after 
either the employer or the employee, with a right of contribution 
available to the employer if the government ends up collecting from it 
the unwithheld tax.131 
12s Whenever there are dual remittance obligations of this sort, as compared with a sys­
tem in which only one party has a remittance obligation, then there are obviously two 
sources (rather than one source) of remittance compliance costs. For example, if we simply 
eliminated the remittance role for employee/individual taxpayers and made no other 
changes (a system known as final withholding), this would presumably reduce compliance 
costs compared with the dual remittance regime. And such a system might be optimal if 
society decided not to allow adjustments for the individual circumstances of employees (via 
various deductions and credits). Indeed, for some low-income taxpayers who have no 
itemized deduction and who work for only one employer, such a system would have much 
to recommend it, because of the savings in both compliance and administrative costs. If, 
however, society does want to allow individualized adjustments, a regime of dual remit­
tance makes more sense. 
129 Church v. Commissioner, 810 F.2d 19 (2d Cir. 1987); Edwards v. Commissioner, 39 
T.C. 78, 83 (1962), aff'd, 323 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1963); Goins v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 1243 (1998). 
130 Bittker & Lokken, note 107, <JI 111.5. 
131 It is not exactly like joint-and-several liability in practice. It is more like primary and 
secondary liability, as the government always goes after the employer first for the amounts 
that were supposed to be withheld, and then would go after the employee only if that were 
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Placing the initial remittance obligation on the employer makes 
sense from an efficiency perspective, both because the employer will 
generally be the lower-compliance-cost remitter of the tax (owing to 
the economies of scale of compliance discussed above) and because 
the employer will be the lower-enforcement-cost remitter (owing to 
the economies of scale of enforcement discussed above). Likewise, it 
makes sense to allow for recovery from the employee in those cases 
where the employee is most likely to have money with which to pay 
the tax (namely, where the tax has not in fact been withheld from the 
employee's wages). 
Our framework would also help to explain the numerous tax with­
holding rules other than those for wage withholding. For example, 
under the Code, there is withholding on tips (which are obviously akin 
to wages )132 as well as on gambling winnings.133 In both cases, it is 
easy to imagine a problem of either judgment-proof taxpayers or tax­
payers who are relatively costly for the tax enforcement authorities to 
pursue. Likewise, the rules requiring tax withholding by U.S. taxpay­
ers on payments to foreign individuals or foreign firms can be seen not 
so much as a response to the problem of insufficiently capitalized tax­
payers, but to the problem of missing (or beyond the reach of our 
government) taxpayers.134 Indeed, other countries make even greater 
use of withholding regimes than does the United States, often requir­
ing payers to withhold and remit taxes on domestic interest and divi­
dend payments as well as on payments to independent contractors of 
various sorts.135 
Even some U.S. states require tax withholding in situations in which 
the U.S. federal tax law does not. For example, both Minnesota and 
Massachusetts require withholding for payments to certain types of 
independent contractors, which under U.S. federal tax law would not 
be subject to withholding. In Minnesota it is payments to certain con­
struction-industry contractors,136 and in Massachusetts it is payments 
unsuccessful. In contrast, with joint-and-several liability, the plaintiff can literally choose 
whichever joint tortfeasor it wants to go after. 
132 Tips present even bigger noncompliance problems than with wages generally. In­
deed, tips are such a problem that the Code now requires large restaurants not only to 
withhold for tips, but also to report to the Service for each member of their wait staff an 
allocated amount of the restaurant's overall revenue. See generally Yoram Margalioth, 
The Case Against Tipping, 9 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 117 (2006) (arguing in favor of 
moving towards service charges and away from tipping for a number of reasons, including 
concerns about tax evasion). 
m See generally IRS, Publication No. 505, Tax Withholding and Estimated Tax (2010). 
134 See generally IRS, Publication No. 515, Withholding of Tax on Nonresident Aliens 
and Foreign Entities (2009). 
135 Germany is one example. See Juhani Kesti, European Tax Handbook 245 (2006). 
136 Minnesota now requires taxpayers to withhold and remit taxes on amounts paid to 
certain contractors in the construction trade if the total payments for the year are expected 
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to certain visiting performers and lecturers.137 In both cases, it is clear 
that the concern is with the administrative cost of enforcing tax com­
pliance with these groups of payees. Our framework suggests that, 
because of the incidence analysis discussed above, imposing the remit­
tance obligation in all of these cases on the larger party (who is easier 
or cheaper to target with enforcement efforts) comes closest to effi­
ciently achieving the policymaker's desired level of revenue subject to 
distributional considerations. 
A similar story can be used to explain why governments that use 
retail sales taxes invariably assign the primary remittance obligation to 
the retail sellers rather than retail purchasers. There are obvious 
economies of scale to enforcing sales tax remittances against large re­
tail sellers rather than against hundreds or thousands of individual 
purchasers. It would be the height of folly to insist on auditing every 
individual who makes a retail purchase at a Wal-Mart store in a given 
year rather than simply to audit the store itself. This is because, to 
apply our framework, Wal-Mart is obviously a lower-cost tax remitter 
than its customers would be. To illustrate the futility of imposing the 
retail sales tax remittance obligation on retail purchasers, consider the 
much-maligned use tax. When a consumer purchases goods by mail 
order, Internet, or otherwise from outside the state, the state govern­
ment will often impose a so-called use tax (charged at the same rate as 
the retail sales tax) to be remitted by the purchaser if the seller does 
not remit the tax on the purchaser's behalf. Unsurprisingly, the com­
pliance rate for such use taxes is generally thought to be close to 
zero.138 Indeed, this is one of the reasons why more states are increas­
ingly seeking to impose a sales-tax remittance obligation on online 
out-of-state retail sellers such as Amazon and iTunes, despite the po­
tential constitutional objections.139 
to exceed a certain threshold. Minn. Stat. § 290.92, Subdiv. 31 (2009). For a description of 
this new rule (effective beginning January 1, 2009), see Minnesota Income Tax Withholding 
on Payments to Independent Contractors in the Construction Trades, http://www.taxes. 
state.mn.us/taxes/withholding/tax_information/factsheets/wfs18_08.pdf (last visited June 
25, 2010) 
137 Massachusetts requires withholding and remittance for taxes on payments to per­
formers, visiting lecturers, and the like. See generally Mass. Dept. of Revenue, A Guide to 
Withholding Taxes on Performers and Performing Entities, http://www.mass.gov/Ador/ 
docs/dor/Publ/PDFS/performers.pdf (last visited June 25, 2010). 
138 See, e.g., Trymaine Lee, State Steps Up Efforts to Collect a Sales Tax Owed by More 
in a Digital Age, N.Y. Times, Apr. 15, 2008, at BO (Noting that "[o]nly 5 percent of the 
approximately 9.6 million residents who filed [New York] state income tax returns for 2006 
listed anything owed" on the line for the use tax on their returns.) 
139 Sewell Chan, The "Amazon Tax" and the "iTunes Tax" Compared, N.Y. Times: City 
Room, Dec. 18, 2008, http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/12/18/the-amazon-tax-and­
the-i tunes-tax-compared. 
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Another example of current tax remittance law that seems roughly 
consistent with the framework of this Article is in the area of gift 
transfers. Gifts, whether inter vivos transfers or bequests, are not gen­
erally thought of as market transfers. Indeed, to be treated as a gift 
for tax purposes the transfers cannot be accompanied by the same sort 
of quid pro quo normally associated with market exchange. There­
fore, it could be argued that TRIPs would have no application to the 
gift context. On the other hand, it is not unusual to think of gifts as 
involving some element of reciprocity, and economists have usefully 
modeled gifts and bequests as a type of exchange, with the donor ex­
pecting something in return from the donee, albeit not necessarily as a 
result of any explicit contract. In any event, it would not stretch the 
underlying idea of TRIPs beyond recognition to apply it to the gift/ 
bequest context and thus to argue that, under traditional (extreme) 
Coasean and TRIPs assumptions, the assignment of the gift/bequest 
tax remittance obligation should not make a difference. Either way, 
the donor will adjust the amount of the gift to achieve a given desired 
amount of after-tax transfer to the donee. Likewise, an application of 
this Article's framework would suggest that, insofar as there are dif­
ferential compliance and administrative costs, the assignment of gift/ 
estate tax remittance responsibility may matter. The choice of the op­
timal assignment of that responsibility would depend on the answer to 
the question we have repeatedly posed: What assignment of tax re­
mittance liability achieves the desired revenue raising and distribu­
tional goals at the lowest combined administrative and compliance 
costs? 
Under current U.S. tax law, the initial or primary tax remittance 
obligation rests with the giver or the estate.140 The amount of the tax 
is determined by the amount of the donor's tax base (total gift trans­
fers less various deductions less a lifetime unified credit) times the 
applicable rate structure, 141 which is fairly progressive. Once the do­
nor has given more than the excluded amount, the unified gift/estate 
tax kicks in, and the donor must remit the tax.142 Of course, we could 
imagine a system where the amount of tax was calculated in exactly 
the same way, but the remittance obligation would be assigned to the 
donee. Indeed, under current law, the donee is secondarily liable for 
the gift/estate tax, for which the donor is primarily liable.143 This is 
not joint and several liability, but rather primary and secondary liabil­
ity.144 That is, if the donor does not pay the liability, the donee must 
140 IRC §§ 2002, 2502(c). 
141 IRC §§ 2502(a), (b), 2505. 
142 IRC §§ 2502, 2505. 
143 IRC §§ 6901(a)(l)(A), 6324(b). 
144 See id. 
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pay it.145 This primary/secondary assignment of tax liability is entirely 
a question of remittance obligation. Either way, the amount is a func­
tion of the base of total gifts and bequests that exceed the exemption. 
(Thus, as we have already emphasized, the calculation of the amount 
of the tax can be divorced from the question of remittance obligation.) 
By contrast, if the amount of the tax were calculated by reference to 
the donee's tax base (say, by including the gift/bequest in the donee's 
gross income), we could likewise imagine various alternative assign­
ments of the remittance responsibility: primary liability for the donee 
with secondary liability for the donor, the reverse, joint and several 
liability, several liability; and so on. Whatever the remittance assign­
ment, however, the amount of the tax would be the same-and, pre­
sumably, whatever the remittance responsibility, we would call this an 
inheritance tax rather than an estate tax. 
The framework of this Article suggests that, whatever base is cho­
sen, the remittance obligation ought to be designed to, ceteris paribus, 
minimize compliance and administrative costs. Given the choice of 
the tax base under current law, the current assignment of remittance 
responsibility seems reasonably sensible. The idea presumably is that 
donors, or their fiduciaries, generally are the lowest-compliance-cost 
remitters, which would indeed be so in many cases. Think of a large 
estate that pays out sums to many different beneficiaries; in such a 
case, compliance and administrative costs presumably could be mini­
mized by assigning initial primary remittance liability on the donor. 
The remittance by the estate in that case can even be thought of as a 
sort of withholding regime. 
Also consistent with our least-cost-remitter rationale is the fact that 
the remittance responsibility under U.S. income tax law, as well as 
under ever other tax regime we are aware of (including various forms 
of consumption tax), is largely nontransferable. That is, tax laws gen­
erally do not allow Coeasean bargaining with respect to who has the 
tax remittance obligation. Put differently, the parties to the transac­
tions that trigger taxation are not generally allowed to elect which of 
them will be responsible for remitting the tax. There are some excep­
tions to this rule. As mentioned above, individual employees can sub­
mit W-4 forms requesting the employer not to withhold any tax from 
their checks, but this will be largely ineffective. The Service will scru­
tinize such requests closely and will not permit such an allocation of 
remittance responsibility solely to the individual employee if it ap­
pears to be abusive. 
Why not? The reason derives from just the sort of enforcement­
cost reasons that we have discussed, which are analogous to the con-
145 IRC § 6324(b). 
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cerns about strategic judgment-proofing from the tort context. That 
is, if buyers and sellers were allowed to engage in Coasean bargaining 
over the allocation of the tax remittance responsibility, there would be 
an incentive for them to allocate that responsibility not necessarily to 
the one with the lowest compliance costs (which would be socially op­
timal) but to the one with the best chance of evading the tax-and 
thus the party for whom the government's cost of enforcing a given 
tax liability is highest. Using the modified Calebreisan language, they 
would not necessarily choose the least-cost harm avoider, but would 
also consider who is the least-cost liability avoider, which is the high­
est-enforcement-cost remitter. This sort of bargain would be joint­
wealth maximizing for the parties involved, but may not be socially 
optimal. Hence, it is no surprise that tax remittance obligations are 
not generally made transferable. (Indeed, if they were transferable, 
one can imagine that retail sellers would seek quickly to shift the re­
mittance responsibility for the sales tax from themselves to their cus­
tomers, many of whom would have an incentive happily to accept that 
responsibility, just as they do for the-effectively unenforceable-re­
mittance obligation for the use tax.) 
B.  Potential Reform: Expanding the Remittance Role of 
(Large) Employers/Payers Withholding for 
Independent Contractors 
As discussed in the previous Section, U.S. tax law imposes on em­
ployers not only the obligation to submit information returns to the 
Service regarding the wages they pay their employees (that is, Form 
W-2s, which include information about the amount paid and the iden­
tity of the payee) but also the obligation to withhold and remit taxes 
on those wages. By contrast, with respect to payments made to inde­
pendent contractors, although there is a reporting obligation (Form 
1099, requiring information similar to a W-2) , the remittance obliga­
tion rests with the payee rather than the payer.146 Why the different 
treatment for independent contractors? Under the framework of this 
Article, the assignment of remittance responsibility to independent 
contractors rather than employers has some initial plausibility if we 
consider only compliance costs. In many situations, as between em­
ployers and their independent contractors, the latter would incur 
lower overall compliance costs. This is because, unlike employees 
(who tend to work for relatively few employers, usually a single em­
ployer), some independent contractors often work for multiple em­
ployers. Thus, rather than require multiple employers to gather the 
146 See IRC § 1401. 
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same information on the same contractor (that is, all of the informa­
tion provided on the Form W-4 that enables the withholding amount 
to be tailored to the circumstances of the individual) , it minimizes 
compliance costs in those cases to let the contractor sort out its own 
tax remittance obligations. 
This does not mean, of course, that the employer/payer is given no 
tax compliance-enforcement role with respect to independent contrac­
tors. The filing of information returns with the Service lowers the cost 
of enforcing the tax laws against the contractors, by giving the Service 
a means of cross-referencing returns to ensure proper remittance. 
Thus, in theory, the line between employees and independent contrac­
tors could be appropriate in that it allows the remittance obligation to 
be assigned to the least-cost remitter while imposing a reporting obli­
gation on payers as a means of keeping the tax remitters honest. 
But that is not the end of the story. First, contractors will some­
times have a higher compliance cost than will employers. This could 
be the case, for example, when the contractors work for only one em­
ployer (or only a few employers) and happen to be classified as an 
independent contractor merely because of the definition of that status. 
Also, if the employer is significantly larger than the contractor, there 
would be economies of scale of the sort described above to placing 
remittance responsibility on the employer. In addition, for the rea­
sons already discussed, the administrative costs of enforcing remit­
tance compliance against independent contractors, especially small 
ones (most especially self-employed individuals) , turns out to be very 
high; and this may be true even with information reporting from the 
payers. 
With small independent contractors, especially those who are self­
employed individuals who work for larger companies but happen to 
have independent contractor status, there is a significant possibility of 
judgment-proofness. In such cases, even the filing of an accurate 
Form 1099 by the employer will not ensure compliance. That is, inso­
far as the worker is judgment-proof, an increase in information report­
ing does not reduce administrative costs. For those individuals, then, 
the fact that their payments are not called "wages" does not diminish 
the concern that led to the adoption of a pay-as-you-earn wage with­
holding in the first place. For these reasons, assigning the remittance 
obligation to contractors rather than to employers has the potential to 
result in substantial tax evasion (with all of the efficiency and distribu­
tional consequences that such evasion implies) or, if the government 
decides to crack down, very substantial enforcement costs. 
This is not a hypothetical problem. By far the largest source of tax 
noncompliance in the United States lies with self-employed taxpayers. 
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U Tax Law Review 
858 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: 
Evidence from the IRS National Research Program for tax year 2001 
shows a huge variation in the rate of misreporting as a percentage of 
actual income by type of income or income offsets (such as deduc­
tions).147 For example, only 1 % of wages and salaries, and only 4% of 
taxable interest and dividends, go unreported.148 Of course, wages, 
salaries, interest, and dividends must all be reported to the Service by 
those who pay them; in addition, wages and salaries are subject to 
employer withholding. Self-employment business income, by con­
trast, is subject to relatively little information reporting, and the esti­
mated noncompliance rate for that sort of income is sharply higher.149 
An estimated 57% of nonfarm proprietor income (which includes in­
dependent contractors) is not reported, which by itself accounts for 
more than a third of the total estimated underreporting for the indi­
vidual income tax.150 Over half of the individual income tax underre­
porting gap is attributable to the underreporting of business income, 
of which nonfarm proprietor self-employed income is the largest 
component.151 
Of course, some significant fraction of this self-employed tax gap is 
attributable to individuals (or small-scale businesses involving several 
individuals) who sell goods or services directly to retail consumers. 
For noncompliance in those settings, there are serious limitations on 
what the law can do by way of either altering the remittance obliga­
tions or introducing new reporting requirements. The compliance and 
administrative costs of requiring individual consumers either to with­
hold and remit or even to file information returns on consumption 
expenditures for federal income tax purposes would obviously be pro­
hibitive. (Again, this is why retail sellers rather than purchasers are 
generally required to remit state retail sales taxes.) However, in those 
cases in which self-employed individuals (or even small businesses 
that involve more than one individual) work for a single-or for rela­
tively few-business employers and they happen to be characterized 
as independent contractors under the common law definition used by 
147 See IRS, Nat'l Research Program, Tax Year 2001 Federal Tax Gap, http://www.irs. 
gov/pub/irs-news/tax_gap_figures.pdf (last visited June 25, 2010). 
148 Id. 
149 See id. 
150 See id. 
151 See id. What these data do not reveal is what fraction of the nonfarm proprietor 
income derives from self-employed individuals, for whom the judgment-proof and pay-as­
you-earn arguments are strongest, and what fraction derives from relatively large (non­
judgment-proof) independent contractor businesses. For the latter category of taxpayers, it 
could be argued that, rather than impose a new remittance obligation on employers, the 
more efficient overall response to noncompliance would be to increase information report­
ing on the part of employer-payers, perhaps by increasing penalties for nonfiling of 1099s. 
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the tax law, there may be some potential efficiency and distributive 
advantages to a change in remittance law. 
Specifically, a good case can be made for expanding the withholding 
and remittance obligation to include payments by (relatively large) 
businesses to (relatively small) independent contractors.152 The obvi­
ous benefit of such a rule would be essentially the same as wage with­
holding and remittance: to improve compliance or, alternatively, to 
reduce the administrative cost of achieving a given level of compli­
ance. That is, the pay-as-you-earn concerns that motivated the adop­
tion of wage withholding in the first place apply just as much to 
payments to individual or small-scale business contractors as they do 
to wage earners.153 
Such proposals have been made before. For example, the General 
Accounting Office in 1992 issued a report calling for, among other 
things, a new system of nonwage contractor withholding.154 Most re­
cently, the Office of the National Taxpayer Advocate, which identified 
the underreporting of self-employment income as one of its primary 
areas of concern (listing only the AMT as a larger tax-related problem 
for U.S. taxpayers), recommended contractor withholding, with spe­
cific withholding percentages to be set, by Congress or Treasury, for 
different categories of contractor-payees.155 Such a change obviously 
152 Note the similarity of this to the practice in some countries of requiring tax to be 
remitted by certain parties in conjunction with certain purchases from small businesses, on 
the grounds that these payments presumably reflect or indicate taxable income of the re­
cipient. Piroska Soos, Self-Employed Evasion and Tax Withholding: A Comparative 
Study and Analysis of the Issues, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 107, 130 (1990). In a few cases, 
there is reverse withholding, under which tax must be remitted in conjunction with certain 
sales to small business taxpayers. Id. at 143-44. Here the link to income is less direct, 
although arguably there is an indirect relation, if the transaction is expected to result in 
taxable profits, as when importers, wholesalers, or retailers, purchase goods for resale. 
Similarly, as mentioned in the text above, some countries require withholding and remit­
tance by payers on payments to independent contractors. See Kesti, note 135, at 245. 
These withholding remittances can in principle be credited against the income tax liability 
of the small businesses, but the presumption is that these businesses often are not in the tax 
net, that is, are not filing tax returns and remitting any tax liability. Countries that require 
withholding on payments to certain businesses usually exclude as withholding agents indi­
viduals in their capacity as consumers and small businesses because they are too numerous 
and otherwise not suitable as withholding agents. 
153 Under current law, payments to corporations are not subject to withholding, but ob­
viously that rule would have to be changed, lest taxpayer-payees get around the require­
ment simply by incorporating. 
154 GAO, Tax Administration: Approaches for Improving Independent Contractor 
Compliance (July 23, 1992), available at http://www.legistorm.com/ls_score/gao/pdf/1992/7/ 
ful22061.pdf. 
155 The report suggests starting with a withholding rate of 3.5% on payments to indepen­
dent contractors who generally maintain "inventories or receive payments for materials 
and supplies" and 5% for contractors who do not, but then allowing Treasury to determine 
appropriate contractor withholding rates for different categories of contractors based on 
the average costs of doing business in those areas. Nat'l Taxpayer Advocate: 2003 Annual 
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would have some disadvantages, as the compliance costs might be too 
large for relatively small business payers, which is why there should be 
an exception for businesses below a given size. Of course, contractor 
compliance could be improved and enforced costs reduced also by 
strengthening the rules regarding information reporting, such as by 
increasing the penalties for failure to report. However, to the extent 
that many self-employed individuals will be either judgment-proof or 
otherwise relativly expensive to prosecute, some version of contractor 
nonwage withholding may make sense. 
One important implication of our analysis is that, if a contractor 
withholding regime were adopted, it should not be made elective, just 
as the assignment of tort liability among various joint tortfeasors 
should not be elective. That is, contractor withholding is another one 
of those areas where Coasean bargaining would tend to exploit exter­
nalities rather than internalize them, as the parties would have an in­
centive to assign the remittance obligation to the least-cost liability 
avoider rather than to the lowest-compliance-cost remitter. Indeed, 
under current law, it would be possible for businesses and their con­
tractors to enter into voluntary withholding arrangements whereby 
the businesses agreed to withhold and remit on their contractor pay­
ments.156 But it should come as no shock that such agreements have 
not become the norm for contractor payments. 
An alternative to introducing contractor withholding would be for 
Treasury to be empowered to define and police the doctrinal bounda­
ries between employees and independent contractors. As the law 
presently stands, the distinction depends on the common law defini­
tion derived from agency law, which, though possibly useful in the tort 
context, proves to be unhelpful in the tax context. A better way to 
draw the line would be to impose the remittance obligation on the 
party who is likely to produce the lowest combination of compliance 
and administrative costs. For the reasons already discussed, that will 
usually be the employer in cases in which the employer is a large cor­
poration and the worker is an individual (or even a small firm). 
Drawing the optimal line between employer remittance and indepen­
dent contractor remittance would require careful study of the relative 
compliance and administrative costs. This is just the sort of job that 
would normally be assigned to Treasury, which could be tasked with 
designing regulations that would make structure optimal remittance 
obligations. Unfortunately, as a result of § 530 of the Revenue Act of 
Report to Congress 257 (Dec. 31 ,  2003) , available at www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/ 
nta_2003_annual_update_mcw_l-15-042.pdf. Similar proposals have been floated before. 
See, e.g., GAO, note 154. 
156 See IRC § 3402(p) (authorizing such agreements). 
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1978,157 Treasury is prohibited from publishing regulations and reve­
nue rulings with respect to the employment status of any individual 
for purposes of the employment taxes. 158 One concrete recommenda­
tion that flows from our analysis is that this prohibition should be 
lifted and Treasury should be allowed to draw a line between em­
ployer remittance and worker remittance that makes tax policy 
sense-that minimizes overall compliance and administrative costs. 
C. The Limits of Vicarious Employer Tax Liability: 
Scope of Employment 
In the preceding analysis, we borrowed ideas from the literature on 
vicarious tort liability to suggest ways in which an analogous efficiency 
argument can be used to justify what amounts to vicarious employer 
tax liability for the taxes owed by employees. That is, because of the 
asymmetric cost of enforcing tax remittance obligations imposed on 
workers (at least when the workers are individuals-whether employ­
ees or independent contractors-or small companies and the employ­
ers are relatively large companies), an efficiency story can be told for 
placing the remittance obligation on the employer rather than on the 
worker. (As we emphasized, this fact is inconsistent with the tax re­
mittance invariance propositions that are conventional wisdom among 
economists.) Here we discuss whether this idea of vicarious employer 
tax liability should be limited by a tax version of the scope-of-employ­
ment doctrine. 
Recall the nature of the scope-of-employment doctrine in tort law: 
It says that employers can be held vicariously and strictly liable for the 
torts of their employees only insofar as those workers commit torts 
within the scope of their work for the employer.159 The efficiency jus­
tification for the rule is that the employer is not the best insurer of the 
employee's non-job-related liabilities; and imposing those costs on 
employers would inefficiently reduce the scale of the employer's en­
terprise. The counter-argument is that perhaps the employer might 
be, in some cases, the best insurer of such risks and might even be, if 
not the cheapest-cost harm avoider, someone who is in a position to 
"bribe" the cheapest-cost harm avoider (probably the worker) to do 
just that-avoid the harm. 
What would the tax analog of vicarious tax liability with a scope-of­
employment limitation look like? It might look very much like the 
current system for withholding and remittance for Social Security, 
157 Revenue Act of 1978 § 530, 26 U.S.C. § 3401 (2006). 
158 Rev. Ru!. 87-41, 1987-1 C.B. 296 (providing guidance with respect to § 530 of the 
Revenue Act of 1978). 
159 See discussion in Section 111.C. 
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Medicare, and unemployment insurance taxes. For those taxes, the 
employer is required to withhold and remit an amount that is calcu­
lated based exclusively on the wage paid by that employer to that em­
ployee.160 Thus, in a sense, those tax remittances are presently limited 
to the scope of employment, as they is calculated by applying the rele­
vant rates exclusively to the wages paid by the employer with the re­
mittance responsibility. As a result, if a worker receives wages from 
more than one employer, each employer is responsible for remitting 
(only) the employment taxes that are attributable to the wage that 
they pay that worker. 
What would the tax analog of vicarious tax liability without a scope­
of-employment limitation look like? Interestingly, it might look 
something like the current rule for income tax withholding in the 
United States. With income tax withholding, the idea is that, in most 
cases, the employer will withhold and remit enough money to cover 
the individual taxpayer's entire income tax liability, not merely the 
income tax liability generated by the wage paid to that employee by 
that employer.161 In general, as a first approximation, the law allows 
employers to withhold in income tax the amount that their employees 
tell them to withhold, that is, whatever amount is determined by the 
employee's Form W-4, which lists the number of exemptions to be 
used in calculating the withholding amount. Indeed, an employee can 
request that no income tax whatsoever be withheld. If, however, the 
withheld amount proves to be too low (and does not at least approxi­
mate the employee's overall tax liability), the IRS has the power to 
send the employer what is called a "lock-in" letter, which will require 
the employer to withhold an amount that more closely approximates 
the employee's true tax liability.162 If the employer fails to enforce 
the lock-in withholding amount, the IRS will collect the difference 
160 A portion of the tax is formally owed by the employer and a portion is owed by the 
employee. However, the employer is responsible for remitting both parts of the tax on 
behalf of its employees. IRC § 3101, 3301, 3402(a). 
161 Taxpayers are encouraged to submit W-4 forms that fine tune the exemptions so that 
this result is approximately achieved. For example, on the IRS web page, there is a with­
holding calculator that takes the employee-taxpayer through a number of questions de­
signed to help him arrive at a withholding amount that approximates not merely the tax 
triggered by the wages paid by the employer, but the overall likely tax liability of the 
employee-taxpayer from all sources. See IRS, IRS Withholding Calculator, http://www.irs. 
gov/individuals/article/O,,id=96196,00.html. (last visited July 11 ,  2010). For taxpayers who 
have employed spouses, the IRS web page suggests that the online calculator will produce 
only a approximation of the appropriate tax remittance. See id. Of course, as with the 
Form W-4, the answer produced by this calculator is relatively easy to manipulate simply 
by inflating the number of dependency exemptions. However, as discussed in the text im­
mediately below, the law has ways of policing such abuse. 
162 See T.D. 9337, 2007-2 C.B. 455. 
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from the employer.163 Indeed, the lock-in withholding amount proba­
bly often results in overwithholding and the need for the employee to 
file for a refund. 
Of course, employees who have both employment income and 
nonemployment (or self-employment) income can avoid .the compul­
sory lock-in withholding by simply filing estimated tax returns and re­
mitting the tax liability triggered by the other income. But they have 
to pay the extra tax. What the employer and employee cannot do-at 
least not without the possible consequence of the lock-in letter-is to 
collude (in one of those nefarious Coasean tax externalizing transac­
tions) to shift all of the remittance responsibility to the employee, who 
then fails to pay the tax. The combination of information reporting 
(on Form W-2) and lock-in letters deter this possibility. The key ob­
servation is that, under current withholding regulations with respect to 
federal income tax withholding, the general rule is that employers are 
expected to remit (that is, are held vicariously liable for) tax owed by 
the employee not only on income triggered by the work with the em­
ployer but also from income generated outside of the employment 
context-unless the tax on other income is paid via separate estimated 
tax payments.164 And this regime is considered neither controversial 
nor unusual, even though it is a form of expanded-and vicarious­
employer tax liability. 
D. In Rem Taxation 
To this point we have focused on the tax remittance analog to tort 
liability, and for the most part we have concentrated on income taxes, 
with some discussion of sales or other consumption taxes. Turning 
briefly now to property taxes, we see an example of a very different 
sort of remittance regime, but one that has obvious Coasean roots: in 
rem taxation-or taxation "against the property." All individual and 
sales taxes are, in the first instance, in personam liabilities in the fol­
lowing sense: They are initially enforceable against the person who is 
the remitter (or, if there are multiple or overlapping remittance obli­
gations, enforceable against the remitters ). Of course, even with in­
come taxes, if the person with the remittance obligation fails to remit, 
the taxing authority can convert that personal liability into a claim 
against taxpayer's personal and real property-an in rem liability.165 
163 IRS, Withholding Questions and Answers, Question 6, http://www.irs.gov/individu 
als/article/0,,id=139412,00.html (last visited July 1, 2010) . 
164 See Bittker & Lokken, note 107, <j[ 111 .5. 
165 In fact, as mentioned in note 107, with U.S. federal income, gift, or estate taxes, the 
U.S. government automatically receives a lien against all the assets of a taxpayer if the 
taxpayer does not pay the taxes upon demand. IRC § 6321. 
Imaged with the Permission ofN.Y.U Tax Law Review 
864 TAX LAW REVIEW [Vol. 63: 
With an in rem tax liability, as with any in rem liability, the obligation 
runs with the land. Thus, if the property is transferred and the in rem 
tax liability has not been satisfied, that liability follows the property; 
and the party to whom the in rem liability is owed, here the govern­
ment, has the power to force a foreclosure sale to satisfy the obliga­
tion. One difference between an in rem and an in personam liability is 
that if an individual who is personally liable goes through a personal 
bankruptcy proceeding, her in personam liabilities will be eliminated; 
whereas, in rem liabilities, again not being personal liabilities, remain 
enforceable.166 Thus, the remedy that is available to the in rem credi­
tor, here the government, would be seizure and sale of the property. 
How are these in rem tax liabilities enforced? Normally the taxing 
authority will have on file the name of one party who is primarily 
responsible for remitting the tax, the party to whom the periodic tax 
bill is sent. This is usually the owner of the property. If the owner 
fails to pay the tax, the tax collector can then initiate steps to foreclose 
on the property. Notice may also be sent to other parties with an 
interest in the property, who may have the option to pay the delin­
quent tax and assume ownership of the property. In any event, as the 
foreclosure process goes forward, all parties with a financial interest in 
the property become aware of that fact. And through a public auc­
tion, the property will eventually end up in the hands of the highest­
valued user.167 
What does all of this have to do with optimal tax remittance policy? 
In fact, in rem tax liability amounts to a sort of modified joint-and­
several liability for the tax that is attributable to a given piece of prop­
erty. That is, the tax collector (like the tort plaintiff) in effect can 
bring its cause of action against any party with an interest in the prop­
erty in question, whichever one has the deepest pocket or is otherwise 
easiest, or cheapest, to identify. In rem tax liability, of course, is not 
exactly like joint-and-several liability, since none of the potential re­
mitters (and potential owners of the property) would be held person­
ally liable. However, because of their financial interests in the tax-
166 See 11 U.S.C. § 524 (2006) (discharging only judgments that are determinations of 
personal liability). 
167 As Joan Youngman explains, two of the consequences that may be intended by term­
ing a tax in rem are (1) that assessments may name the property but not rely on the identi­
fication of the owner to establish tax liability, so that publication may be deemed to notify 
all interested parties of this claim, and (2) there may be a corresponding absence of per­
sonal liability, the remedy for nonpayment being limited to seizure and sale of the property 
itself. See Joan Youngman, Tax on Land and Buildings, in 1 Tax Law Design and Drafting 
264, 278 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996). Youngman counsels against in rem taxes that limit the 
liability, and favors listing as liable for remittance obligation anyone "owning, claiming, 
possessing, or controlling" an interest in the property on the lien date. Id. (citing language 
taken from Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 405 (West 1987)). 
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encumbered property, they would have an incentive, at least to the 
extent of their financial stake, to pay the outstanding tax liability. The 
protection in this situation against potentially judgment-proof taxpay­
ers, of course, is not their personal deep pockets, but the value of the 
property subject to the tax liens. Thus, in rem tax liability provides an 
alternative to deep-pocket vicarious tax liability as a response to the 
sorts of compliance obstacles we have discussed. What is more, as we 
have noted, this sort of in rem liability is in fact already present not 
only for local property taxes, but also for federal income taxes, in cir­
cumstances in which the taxpayers in question have assets that can be 
attached. 
VI . CONCLUSIONS 
Two venerable but heretofore parallel scholarly traditions, tax re­
mittance invariance propositions and Coasean variance and invariance 
assertions in a market context, share much in common. In both set­
tings an equilibrating price will determine which side of the market 
bears the costs, either of a harm or a tax obligation, and in both set­
tings there is the possibility of off-market negotiation that will reach 
private-cost reducing agreements. 
The two traditions differ in the centrality for the TRIPs of the en­
forcement of remittance obligations by the government. In contract 
law, for example, the presumption that maximizing joint benefit is ef­
ficient presumes that there are no third parties involved, but introduc­
ing a third party is not central. In tax the third party (the government, 
as an agent for all citizens) is central, and in particular bargains that 
reduce joint compliance costs may, by increasing the enforcement 
costs of raising revenue, not be socially optimal. To clarify that differ­
ence, we introduce the semantic distinction between the least-cost 
harm avoider, a modification of a standard term in tort analysis that 
corresponds to tax compliance costs, and the least-cost liability 
avoider, which is critically important in tax because the private cost 
saving due to evasion of tax liability does not correspond to a social 
cost saving, and in fact entails additional enforcement costs. 
This new framework allows us to make a number of observations 
about current tax remittance law and some tentative suggestions 
about potential reforms. The assignment of the remittance burden to 
employers rather than employees and to retail sellers rather than con­
sumers are obvious examples of placing tax liability on the least-over­
all-cost tax remitter. Our emphasis on remittance regimes is not 
meant to diminish the importance of information reporting. In some 
situations, however-where pay-as-you-earn Gudgment-proof) or 
"missing taxpayer" concerns are high-information reporting alone 
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will not be enough, and just as the judgment-proof problem may jus­
tify vicarious liability in tort, a related phenomenon may suggest the 
need for a sort of vicarious or joint tax liability in some settings. In­
deed, we argue that this idea could be taken further than it has been, 
for example, with the introduction of withholding for payments to 
contractors-a reform that would directly respond to what is by far 
the largest source of tax noncompliance under the U.S. tax laws: 
under-reporting of self-employed and small business income. 
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